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INTRODUCTION
Attorney fees awarded to prevailing plaintiffs by statute' are a signifi-
cant source of funding for nonprofit public interest groups that sponsor
litigation. 2 Nearly all such organizations require staff attorneys3 to turn
1. A prevailing civil rights plaintiff, for example, is ordinarily entitled to an award of reasonable
attorney fees. See Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (provid-
ing that court may, in its discretion, award "reasonable attorney's fee" to prevailing party). A plaintiff
is entitled to the award unless "special circumstances" would make an award of fees unjust. Newman
v. Piggie Park Enters., 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
Dozens of other federal statutes-concerning such diverse areas as the environment, voting rights,
employment discrimination, and rights of the handicapped-also entitle a prevailing plaintiff to rea-
sonable attorney fees. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) (appendix to Brennan, J.,
dissenting). The standards developed for section 1988 awards "are generally applicable in all cases in
which Congress has authorized an award of fees to a 'prevailing party.'" Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424, 433 n.7 (1983). This Article therefore uses section 1988 to illustrate the principles of statu-
tory attorney fees in public interest cases.
2. In this Article, the term "public interest groups" contemplates groups that share two character-
istics: (1) they are nonprofit entities holding tax-exempt status under sections 501 (c)(3) or 501 (c)(4) of
the Internal Revenue Code, and (2) they finance or provide lawyers for public interest litigation that
can result in statutory fee awards. There is no set agreement on the meaning of public interest litiga-
tion, but the Council For Public Interest Law (now the Alliance for Justice) has defined "public
interest law" as:
efforts to provide legal representation to previously unrepresented groups and interests. Such
efforts have been undertaken in recognition that the ordinary marketplace for legal services
fails to provide such services to significant segments of the population and to significant inter-
ests. Such groups and interests include the poor, environmentalists, consumers, racial and eth-
nic minorities, and others.
COUNCIL FOR PUBLIC INTEREST LAW, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: FINANCING PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW IN AMERICA 6-7 (1976). Examples of public interest groups include the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), and the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund. This Article is not
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over all court-awarded fees to the organization, and many organizations
require cooperating attorneys4 to turn over all or part of any fees resulting
from cases sponsored by the organizations. Yet a rule of legal ethics that
prohibits lawyers from sharing legal fees with nonlawyers' may jeopar-
dize this important source of funding. This Article explores whether the
rule against fee sharing with nonlawyers can or should be enforced
against lawyers who agree to assign statutory legal fees to nonprofit public
interest groups.
The problem is not merely theoretical. I recently conducted an empiri-
cal survey on the fee-sharing practices of public interest groups," and I
directly concerned with legal aid societies or with offices of the Legal Services Corporation, which are
essentially law firms for indigents and unquestionably can receive fees based on work done by their
lawyers. See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 890-92, 902 (1984) (affirming market rate fee award to
Legal Aid Society of New York).
3. The term "staff attorneys" refers to full-time salaried employees of public interest organiza-
tions who work only on matters referred or assigned to them by the organizations. Not all public
interest groups employ staff attorneys. I recently surveyed a wide range of public interest groups, see
infra note 6, and learned that about 50% of all state ACLU affiliates and about 15% of other public
interest groups do not employ any staff attorneys.
4. The term "cooperating attorneys" refers to private lawyers who agree to handle matters for
public interest organizations without salary. According to a recent survey of public interest law
groups, more than three-fourths of such groups call upon cooperating attorneys to handle at least
some of their litigation, and these cooperating attorneys performed, on the average, 28% of the legal
work undertaken by the surveyed groups. See N. ARON, LIBERTY AND JUSTICE FOR ALL: PUBLIC
INTEREST LAW IN THE 1980'S AND BEYOND 33 (1989) (summarizing staffing patterns in public
interest law).
5. The rule provides:
(a) A lawyer or law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer, except that:
(1) an agreement by a lawyer with the lawyer's firm, partner, or associate may provide for
the payment of money, over a reasonable period of time after the lawyer's death, to the law-
yer's estate or to one or more specified persons;
(2) a lawyer who undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer may
pay to the estate of the deceased lawyer that proportion of the total compensation which fairly
represents the services rendered by the deceased lawyer; and
(3) a lawyer or law firm may include nonlawyer employees in a compensation or retirement
plan, even though the plan is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) (1987) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; see
also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) (1986) [hereinafter MODEL
CODE] (identical in all relevant respects). Approximately 30 states have thus far adopted the Model
Rules in some form. See [Manual] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 01:3-01:4 (1988)
(listing states that have adopted the Model Rules through July 1988). Most of the remaining states
continue to base their rules of legal ethics on the Model Code.
6. In December 1987 and January 1988, I sent questionnaires to every chapter and affiliate of the
ACLU, and to dozens of other public interest organizations that finance or conduct litigation. I agreed
to keep the identities of the specific respondents confidential unless they gave me permission to disclose
their names. I have the survey results on file.
The ACLU list was prepared by the ACLU's National Office in New York City in July 1987, and
included addresses for all of the ACLU's affiliates, chapters, regional offices, and projects. See ACLU
Affiliate List (on file with author). I received 52 responses from the ACLU mailing.
I created a list of non-ACLU public interest groups by studying the Encyclopedia of Associations.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS (22d ed. 1988). I reviewed every entry under relevant headings
(Attorneys, Civil Rights, Law, Legal Aid, Litigation, and Public Interest) for organizations which
might sponsor or conduct public interest litigation. My final mailing list included more than 75 public
interest organizations, including the Washington Legal Foundation, the Center for Public Representa-
tion, the Center for Law in the Public Interest, the Women's Law Project, and the NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund, Inc. I received 42 responses, and 26 organizations said they provided
lawyers or financial support for litigation that could lead to court-awarded fees.
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received a number of anecdotal reports that lawyers and bar committees
are applying the fee-sharing prohibition against public interest organiza-
tions. One ACLU affiliate that recently began requiring cooperating at-
torneys to share fees reported that "several cooperating attorneys have
raised concerns about sharing fees." Another ACLU affiliate said: "We
have had at least two cooperating attorneys refuse to turn over fees. We
were unable to collect our share, even after complaining to the State Bar
in one case." At a third, a former staff attorney has retained fees on
grounds that turning over the fees would violate the fee-sharing rule.' An-
other ACLU affiliate recently settled a dispute with a cooperating law
firm that reneged on an agreement to share half of its court-awarded fees.
And in Maine, the Professional Ethics Commission formally ruled that a
cooperating attorney's agreement to turn over a specified percentage of the
fees to a foundation connected with the state's ACLU affiliate violated the
fee-sharing rule because it "would involve splitting legal fees with a
nonlawyer." 8
Organizations other than the ACLU also have had problems with the
fee-sharing rule. In a widely publicized case, the NAACP Special Contri-
bution Fund filed suit against four of its former staff attorneys, seeking to
recover more than two million dollars in fees awarded to the defendants
when they were full-time salaried employees of the NAACP.' The former
staff lawyers argue that the rule against fee sharing prohibits them from
turning over their fees to a nonlawyer group such as the NAACP.10 The
There are undoubtedly many groups that I did not contact. Some groups are not listed in the
Encyclopedia of Associations or any other standard source, and new groups form all the time. See,
e.g., Whistleblower Forms Foundation for Protection, L.A. Daily J., July 18, 1988, at 5, col. 1 (new
foundation, currently seeking tax-exempt status from IRS, intends to "set up a network of attorneys to
provide free legal aid for whistleblowers").
7. The former staff attorney, who recently entered private practice, received a $30,000 fee award
based on work done as a full-time staff attorney, but retained $10,000 for herself. She has argued,
among other things, that the organization failed to maintain the kind of separate litigation fund de-
scribed in National Treasury Employees Union v. Department of the Treasury, 656 F.2d 848 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (discussed infra at notes 146-58 and accompanying text). She has not fully explained why
she gave the remaining $20,000 of the fee award to the organization. The affiliate has now filed suit
to recover the $10,000 in fees thus far retained by the attorney. Telephone interviews with the Execu-
tive Director of the affiliate (June 29, 1988 & March 27, 1989).
8. Maine Comm'n on Professional Ethics, Op. 69, at 2 (1986) (on file with author). The Com-
mission commented that cases awarding fees directly to public interest litigation organizations
(PILO's) had "no relevance to whether an attorney and PILO can agree to split legal fees awarded to
the attorney by a court." Id. at 2 n.2. But a concurring opinion argued that a court-awarded fee
belonged to the client, not to the attorney, and that the fee-sharing rule "cannot prohibit an agreement
for division of a fee award between client and PILO." Id. at 3-4 (concurring opinion).
9. See NAACP-Special Contribution Fund v. Atkins, No. 87-0156-CV-W-6 (W.D. Mo. amended
complaint filed Mar. 10, 1988) (suit filed to recover fees awarded in Ohio desegregation case and
other cases sponsored by NAACP). The NAACP Special Contribution Fund is an unincorporated
association affiliated with the NAACP. It is tax exempt under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code, so contributions to it are tax deductible. It was formed in the early 1960's, when the
NAACP itself was not qualified under section 501(c)(3) to receive tax-deductible contributions. A
majority of the board of the Fund consists of nonlawyers. Telephone interview with Grover Hankin,
NAACP General Counsel (March 28, 1989).
10. See generally N.A.A.C.P. Sues Four of its Former Lawyers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1987, at
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case is still in the early stages. Another group reported that the federal
government had once challenged the group's right to get fees, and had
dropped the issue only after learning that the organization was chartered
as a legal aid organization under state law."
On the other hand, several bar associations have formally approved pol-
icies that require attorneys to turn over court-awarded attorney fees to
public interest groups. In 1979, the Bar Association of Greater Cleveland
ruled that staff attorneys and cooperating attorneys for a nonprofit group
dedicated to securing full legal rights for women could ethically agree to
remit to the organization all fees awarded in sponsored matters.1 2 In 1984,
the Nebraska State Bar approved the local ACLU's policy of requiring
cooperating attorneys to turn over thirty-five percent of all court-awarded
fees to the ACLU for deposit into a fund used solely for litigation. Early
in 1989, the Florida Bar ruled that the ACLU of Florida could ethically
require cooperating and staff attorneys to share all or part of their court-
awarded fees with the ACLU for deposit into a fund used exclusively for
litigation purposes. 14
These conflicting anecdotal data suggest that questions about the fee-
sharing rule are likely to continue arising in public interest litigation until
there is a definitive interpretation of the rule. This uncertainty is of con-
23, col. 1. As this Article is being written, the lawyers are still skirmishing over jurisdiction and other
preliminary issues. See NAACP-Special Contribution Fund v. Atkins, No. 87-0156-CV-W-6 (W.D.
Mo. Mar. 14, 1989) (order granting motion to dismiss claim against Atkins without prejudice, and
giving parties 30 days to file joint motions for such alternatives as dismissals without prejudice or stay
of proceedings while certain claims are severed and transferred); see also In re NAACP, Special
Contribution Fund, Nos. 87-3366 & 87-3673 (6th Cir. June 13, 1988) (WESTLAW, CTA6
database) (reversing district court's order enjoining prosecution of Missouri suit).
11. The group also reported that more than half the members of its Board of Directors were
lawyers. The identity of the group is confidential.
12. Bar Ass'n of Greater Cleveland Professional Ethics Comm., Op. 141 (June 21, 1979) (on file
with author) (holding that staff attorney could agree to remit fees as condition of employment).
13. See Letter from George Green, President, Nebraska Civil Liberties Union, to Robert Barlow,
Advisory Opinion Comm., Nebraska State Bar Ass'n (July 9, 1984) (on file with author) (setting
forth group's policy and requesting ruling); Letter from John Taylor, Executive Director, Nebraska
Civil Liberties Union (undated) (on file with author) (stating that Nebraska State Bar had approved
Nebraska Civil Liberties Union's policy as stated in George Green's letter).
14. Letter from Patricia Allen, Ethics Counsel, The Florida Bar, to Larry Spalding, Past Presi-
dent, ACLU of Florida (January 19, 1989) (on file with author) (attaching letter of query from
ACLU and reporting that Florida Bar's Professional Ethics Committee voted on January 11, 1989,
with one dissent, that ACLU's policies regarding fees awarded to cooperating and staff attorneys "do
not involve fee-splitting"). The Ethics Committee did not issue a written opinion, but Ms. Allen's
letter elaborated on its decision:
Because the arrangements you describe do not involve fee-splitting, Rule 4-5.4(a) is inapplica-
ble. In other words, . . . attorneys who join together with nonprofit civil rights organizations
to furnish legal assistance to aggrieved parties are not ethically obligated to accept or keep all
or, for that matter, any part, of the fee that may be awarded.
Only seven months earlier, however, an Assistant Ethics Counsel for the Florida Bar had written
the ACLU a preliminary opinion that "any arrangement or agreement by the [ACLU's cooperating]
attorneys to give a portion of court-awarded fees to the organization would be prohibited." Letter
from Kathy Papantonio to James Green, ACLU of Florida (June 28, 1988) (on file with author)
(emphasis in original). But Ms. Papantonio went on to state: "If individual attorneys desire to make
donations to the organization, unrelated to any legal fees awarded, however, they may do so." Id.
(emphasis in original).
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siderable significance to public interest groups. According to a recently
published survey, court-awarded attorney fees generated by staff attorneys
and cooperating attorneys account for about nine percent of all income to
public interest groups that sponsor litigation.15 Given the continuing
proliferation of fee-shifting statutes16 and the decline in foundation sup-
port and private donations, 17 attorney fee awards are likely to become
even more significant.
Staff attorneys are an especially important source of fees. Virtually
every public interest organization requires its staff attorneys to turn over
all court-awarded fees.1 These fees finance many litigation activities that
do not generate fees, including cases that are settled before any suit is
filed, cases in which the sponsored client is a defendant, administrative
matters for which fees are not available, cases in which the organization is
an amicus rather than a party, and cases in which the sponsored client
does not prevail. In addition, fee awards finance such things as educa-
tional activities, client screening, capital improvements, policy develop-
ment, scholarships, recruitment and training programs, supervision of co-
operating attorneys, and general overhead expenses.
If states were to strictly enforce the fee-sharing prohibition against staff
attorneys for public interest organizations, the impact on public interest
litigation would be severe. In the ACLU, over forty-two percent of the
affiliates say they "could not employ any staff lawyers," and over thirty-
six percent "could not afford to employ as many staff attorneys" as they
do now. Only twenty-one percent say they could keep all of their present
15. N. ARON, supra note 4, at 39-40 & 46 table 2.6 (reporting on results of 1983-84 survey).
My survey showed that about 40% of all ACLU affiliates and other public interest groups have
derived more than 10% of their income between 1983 and 1988 from fee awards.
16. In comparison with past decades, increasing numbers of cases sponsored by public interest
groups are eligible for fee awards. Congress passed "a great spate" of new fee-shifting statutes during
the 1970's. See M. DERFNER & A. WOLF, 1 COURT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEEs 1.02, at 1-27 to 1-
28 (1988). In the 1980's, Congress has focused on passing fee-shifting laws increasing the availability
of fee awards in litigation against federal administrative agencies. See id. at 1-28.
17. One survey of foundation support for public interest law shows that the average group exper-
ienced a 36% decline in foundation funds between 1975 and 1983. See N. ARON, supra note 4, at
51-52. More recent statistics about foundation donations to equal rights and legal services groups
show that a four year increase in both the dollar value and number of grants reported was reversed in
1986. See Clinton, Trends in Foundation Giving, in THE FOUNDATION DIRECTORY xxxi, xxxiii
(11th ed. 1987); see also O'Connor & Epstein, Rebalancing the Scales of Justice: Assessment of
Public Interest Law, 7 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 483, 502 (1984) ("While funds for conservatives
have increased rapidly, those earmarked for liberal public interest law are in decline." (footnote omit-
ted)); Walker, The Role of Foundations in Helping to Reach the Civil Rights Goals of the 1980's, 37
RUTGERS L. REV. 1055, 1056-57 (1985) (discussing "harsh reality" that substantial cutbacks in fed-
eral assistance to nonprofit groups will confront foundations with "difficult funding choices in the
years ahead").
To compound the decline in foundation grants, individual charitable giving has recently begun to
level off. See Cox, New Figures Show Growth In Donations Has Slackened, Wall St. J., June 13,
1988, § 2, at 19, col. 5 (new study shows that individual giving is growing more slowly than in past
years).
18. Among the ACLU groups employing staff attorneys, 25 of 26 require staff attorneys to turn
over all fees. Among the other groups in my survey, all but one required staff attorneys to turn over
all court-awarded fees. Not surprisingly, no group allowed staff attorneys to keep all fees.
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staff lawyers. The answers from organizations other than the ACLU were
equally pessimistic. Nearly one-third say they could not employ any staff
attorneys if staff attorneys did not turn over all fees, and another third
could not employ as many staff attorneys as they do now. ("Or we might
fold," added one group.) Less than thirty-eight percent say they could
continue to employ all of their staff lawyers.19
Cutting back on staff attorneys would strike at the nerve center of pub-
lic interest litigation. Staff attorneys develop expertise in an organization's
area of law; they understand and are committed to the group's goals and
policies; they are readily available to screen and handle cases; and they
are uniquely qualified to help the group in selecting, monitoring, and
training cooperating lawyers.2 Allowing public interest groups to share
fees based on work done by staff and cooperating attorneys is thus impor-
tant to the continued vitality of public interest litigation. But does the
ethical prohibition against fee sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers
stand in the way?
The issue is not whether public interest groups are entitled to reim-
bursement for providing legal services. The law is settled that an attorney
who personally receives a fee award must reimburse the organization for
its actual out-of-pocket costs in furnishing the lawyer's services.2' Nor is
the issue whether attorneys may donate fees to public interest organiza-
tions; the rule against fee sharing in no way prohibits attorneys from
making charitable contributions.12 Yet voluntary donations cannot substi-
tute for contractual agreements to share fees. Donations simply would not
yield as much money. A staff attorney would have little incentive to do-
nate fees to an organization after leaving its employ. A cooperating attor-
ney might keep fees to cover overhead relating to a case. Even attorneys
19. One of the most interesting comments came from an organization that said it could afford to
keep all of its present staff attorneys, but said it "would take fewer high risk cases." Since risky cases
are more likely to result in a loss-and thus in a financial loss to the organization because expenses
are not reimbursed-many other organizations might also become more cautious in their case selec-
tion, avoiding cases that could succeed only by breaking new legal ground.
20. In particular, staff attorneys can serve as co-counsel in sponsored cases, whereas a group's lay
employees obviously cannot. Having staff attorneys serve as co-counsel ensures that clients and coop-
erating attorneys consider the public interest implications of sponsored cases, and also ensures that the
group will be kept informed of all developments in each case. For this reason, many ACLU affiliates
require that clients and cooperating attorneys allow their staff attorneys to serve as co-counsel in all
cases sponsored by the group. See, e.g., ACLU of Louisiana Cooperating Attorney Agreement 2 (May
25, 1988) (on file with author) (ACLU General Counsel's name and title must be on all pleadings);
ACLU of Maryland Agreement 2 (undated) (on file with author) ("An ACLU staff attorney will
appear as 'Of Counsel' on all papers filed by the Lawyer(s)."); ACLU of New Mexico Guidelines for
Cooperating Attorneys 2 (Nov. 1986) (on file with author) ("Legal Director's name is to be listed
underneath that of the cooperating attorney" on all pleadings).
21. See Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (reimbursing
nonprofit organization for out-of-pocket expenses does not violate prohibition against fee sharing)
(discussed infra at text accompanying notes 115-21), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alyeska Pipe-
line Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975); infra note 121 (citing additional cases).
22. See Jordan v. United States Dep't of Justice, 691 F.2d 514, 516 n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (attor-
ney who receives fee award may ethically donate excess over nonprofit group's cost to nonprofit group,
"just as he could donate monies obtained from other sources").
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who did donate fee awards might hold back part of their fees to cover
income taxes,2" and the tax laws would limit the percentage of their in-
come they could claim as charitable deductions.24 In practical terms, then,
the issue is whether public interest groups have or should have the right
to raise money by sharing court-awarded legal fees.
Section I of this Article outlines the history and scope of the fee-sharing
rule, as well as exceptions to it. This section concludes that fee-sharing
agreements between lawyers and public interest groups technically violate
the rules of legal ethics. Section II examines the effect of federal fee-
shifting statutes on the rule against fee sharing with nonlawyers, and con-
cludes that neither the statute itself nor a judicial exception for groups
with "separate litigation funds" definitively solves the problem. Section
III asks whether the states ought to create an express exception to the fee-
sharing rule so that lawyers may share fees with public interest organiza-
tions. I argue that the states should create such an exception, but I recog-
nize that they may be unwilling to do so. Section IV asks whether the
states have the constitutional power to prohibit lawyers from sharing
court-awarded legal fees with public interest groups. I conclude that states
probably do not have this power.
I. HISTORY AND SCOPE OF THE RULE AGAINST FEE SHARING
A. History of the Rule Against Fee Sharing
The rule against sharing legal fees with nonlawyers traces back to a
1729 English Act of Parliament2 5 that forbade an attorney to allow any
nonattorney26 to use the attorney's name for profit.27 In the early 1800's,
23. The IRS has ruled that an attorney appointed to defend an indigent must include fee awards
in his gross income unless he is required by contract to turn over all fees to his employer or the legal
aid society. See Rev. Rul. 65-282, 1965-2 C.B. 21.
24. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (West 1987) (prohibiting individuals from deducting more than
50% of their adjusted gross income for charitable contributions). Thus, staff attorneys who voluntarily
donate all fees to an organization would have to pay taxes on donated amounts in excess of 50% of
their income. Consequently, staff attorneys would have a strong incentive to withhold at least enough
fees to cover taxes on nondeductible donations.
25. Regulation of Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 2 Geo. 2, ch. 23 (1729). This omnibus act "For
the better Regulation of Attorneys and Solicitors" set standards for fees, education, admissions, and
several other facets of legal practice.
26. For general discussions of the history of the distinction between lawyers and nonlawyers, see
Alexander, The History of the Law As an Independent Profession and the Present English System, in
THE LAWYER'S PROFESSIONAL INDEPENDENCE: PRESENT THREATS/FUTURE CHALLENGES 1
(1984); Baker, Solicitors and the Law of Maintenance 1590-1640, 32 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 56 (1973).
Attorneys emerged as a distinct profession in England around 1250, and over several hundred years
gained a monopoly on practice in the courts. See Alexander, supra, at 8-12. In the London courts, the
demarcation between lawyers and nonlawyers sharpened in the sixteenth century, when a nonlawyer
(then called a "homo laicus") was jailed for appearing in court. See id. at 10. But in many lower
courts outside of London, nonlawyer "apprentices" were permitted to solicit cases and represent cli-
ents. See Baker, supra, at 57-60. The line between lawyers and nonlawyers grew brighter in the
early 1700's as Parliament clamped down on the growing problem of unauthorized practice.
27. 2 Geo. 2, ch. 23, at § XVII (1729). A 1749 statute expanded and reinforced this prohibition.
See Regulation of Attorneys and Solicitors Act, 22 Geo. 2, ch. 46, §§ II-XIX (1749).
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this language was the basis for the first case to strike down a fee-sharing
arrangement between a lawyer and a nonlawyer. In Tench v. Roberts,28
an English court invalidated an attorney's agreement to pay his clerk one-
third of the profits as a salary, because this in effect permitted a nonlaw-
yer to use the attorney's name for profit.29
The United States Supreme Court first addressed fee sharing between
lawyers and nonlawyers shortly after the Civil War. In Meguire v. Cor-
wine,30 the plaintiff, a nonlawyer, had helped the defendant secure an
appointment as special counsel for the government in the Farragut Prize
Cases and had assisted the defendant in conducting the case. In exchange,
the defendant had agreed to pay the plaintiff half of his fees.31 When a
dispute arose, the Court said that fee-sharing agreements were "forbidden
by a statute or condemned by public policy" 2 and were "clearly illegal."3
Many later cases also chastised lawyers for paying nonlawyers a share of
the fees to solicit clients.34
In 1908, the ABA adopted its influential Canons of Professional Eth-
ics.35 Canon 28 prohibited lawyers from paying nonlawyers to refer
28. 56 Eng. Rep. 1047 (1819).
29. The prohibition against sharing fees with a nonlawyer was not absolute, however. See Can-
dler v. Candler, 37 Eng. Rep. 834, 836-37 (1821) (allowing widow to share in profits from her
deceased husband's law practice). The Candler exception survives today in the Model Rules and
Model Code, under which lawyers may direct a "firm, partner, or associate" to share fees with an
estate or a specified person (such as a spouse) for a reasonable time after death. See MODEL RULES,
supra note 5, Rule 5.4(a)(1); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 3-102(A)(1). Despite the age of the
exception, its scope is still in flux. Compare O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld and Kempster, No.
65,760 (Ill. Mar. 29, 1989) (WESTLAW, IL-CS database) (fee-sharing rule prohibits lawyers taking
over sole practitioner's practice from sharing legal fees with sole practitioner's widow) with Chicago
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Responsibility, Op. 85-1 (Oct. 1985) (lawyer taking over clients
from deceased sole practitioner may split fees with estate if clients consent), summary printed in
[Ethics Opinions] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:3204 (1986).
30. 101 U.S. 108 (1879).
31. Id. at 108.
32. Id. at 111.
33. Id. at 112.
34. In Alpers v. Hunt, 86 Cal. 78, 87-90, 24 P. 846, 849-50 (1890), for example, two lawyers
promised to pay a nonlawyer one-third of their fee if the nonlawyer convinced a wealthy woman to
retain the lawyers. The court declared the agreement void. Accord Langdon v. Conlin, 67 Neb. 243,
247, 93 N.W. 389, 390 (1903) (fee-sharing agreement was just "a thinly veiled subterfuge" for non-
lawyer to violate state's unauthorized practice laws, which protected clients from "shysters, charlatans
and mountebanks"). A more recent example is In re Frankel, 20 N.J. 588, 120 A.2d 603 (1956), in
which a lawyer had paid 25% of his legal fees to a nonlawyer for referring auto accident cases to the
lawyer. The court suspended the lawyer for two years, but Justice Brennan (then on the New Jersey
Supreme Court) thought suspension was too light and would have voted for disbarment. 20 N.J. at
599, 120 A.2d at 609 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
In contrast, lawyers themselves were generally allowed to solicit cases in person through the early
1900's. See Chreste v. Louisville Ry. Co., 167 Ky. 75, 84, 180 S.W. 49, 53 (1915) (since only one case
up to that time had voided solicited contract, court held that "mere solicitation on the part of an
attorney, unaccompanied by fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, or imposition of some kind"
would not void contract between attorney and client).
35. Earlier codes of ethics did not mention fee sharing between lawyers and nonlawyers. The
earliest codes of ethics in America were essays by legal writers and lecturers, which were not binding
in any jurisdiction. See, e.g., 2 D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 752-75 (2d ed. 1836); G.
SHARSWOOD, AN ESSAY ON PROFESSIONAL ETHics (5th ed. 1896) (originally published in 1854 as A
COMPEND OF LECruREs ON THE AIMS AND DTIES OF THE PROFESSION OF THE LAW, DELIVERED
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cases,36 but the Canons did not otherwise prohibit fee sharing with
nonlawyers. This omission left open the possibility that lawyers could
share fees for such purposes as compensating employees or paying for le-
gitimate services.
Courts and legislatures soon closed this gap. 7 In response to the emer-
gence of giant corporations that began offering legal services at the turn of
the century, including one law corporation that employed an astonishing
six thousand lawyers nationwide, 8 many states passed laws prohibiting
corporations from practicing law.3 9 The laws against corporate practice
BEFORE THE LAW CLASS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA). The first formally binding code
was the Alabama Code of 1887. See Armstrong, A Century of Legal Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063,
1063-64 (1978).
36. Canon 28 said it was "disreputable" for a lawyer "to pay or reward, directly or indirectly,
those who bring or influence the bringing of such cases to his office." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL
ETHIcS Canon 28 (1908). This prohibition was an old one and had been enforced for many years by
state criminal statutes, whether the nonlawyer received a salary, a flat fee, or a share of the fees for
referring cases. See In re Clark, 108 A.D. 150, 158-67, 95 N.Y.S. 388, 394-99 (1905) (attorney who
violated state law by paying nonlawyer three to five dollars per case to refer more than 2000 claims
was disbarred for running "litigation hunting agency"), affd, 184 N.Y. 222, 77 N.E. 1 (1906); Allen
v. Hawks, 30 Mass. (13 Pick.) 79, 83 (1832) (construing state statute that prescribed penalty for any
person who promised "any valuable consideration" to procure note with intent to profit from legal
fees arising from collection suit on note).
37. Many states had already attacked fee sharing through statutes prohibiting the unauthorized
practice of law. See generally Rhode, Policing the Professional Monopoly: A Constitutional and
Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REv. 1, 6-8 (1981) (collect-
ing statutes and cases). Unauthorized practice statutes did not mention fee sharing per se, but a
nonlawyer's receipt of legal fees was sometimes cited as evidence that the nonlawyer was illegally
practicing law. See, e.g., Alpers v. Hunt, 86 Cal. 78, 88, 24 P. 846, 849 (1890); Candler v. Candler,
37 Eng. Rep. 834, 836 (1821) (widow had not acted as attorney, "but the point contended for...
would be, that her taking the profits would be evidence that she had done so").
38. This was the Associated Lawyers' Company, a corporation partially owned by nonlawyers.
See In re Associated Lawyers' Co., 134 A.D. 350, 351, 119 N.Y.S. 77, 77-78 (1909). The company's
initial capitalization was an impressive $125,000, and all but five stockholders were lawyers. The
company's main business was collecting claims without filing suit, a field open to nonlawyers, but
when a lawsuit was necessary to collect a claim, the company used lawyers in its employ. See 134
A.D. at 351, 119 N.Y.S. at 77-78. Companies like Associated Lawyers had many advantages for
clients. They offered one-stop shopping for collection work and litigation, and quality was paired with
convenience because they employed and monitored lawyers familiar with collection work in all parts
of America. This saved clients the trouble of locating competent collection lawyers out of town, and
the "brand names" of the giant law corporations gave them a strong incentive to ensure quality so that
clients would return with more business.
Another pioneer law corporation was the Co-operative Law Company. Through its legal staff, Co-
operative transacted "a general law business, including the prosecution and defense of suits; incorpo-
ration of business enterprises; drawing of contracts, leases and agreements, drawing and probating of
wills, management of estates, etc." In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 481, 92 N.E. 15, 15
(1910). The board of directors selected and supervised all staff attorneys and set their fees. See id.
The lives of Associated and Co-operative were glorious but short. After New York passed a statute
forbidding corporations from practicing law, neither corporation was able to renew its corporate char-
ter. See Co-operative Law, 198 N.Y. at 482-84, 92 N.E. at 16; Associated Lawyers, 134 A.D. at
352-53, 119 N.Y.S. at 78-79. According to Associated Lawyers, such organizations had never prop-
erly offered a legal practice. 134 A.D. at 352, 119 N.Y.S. at 78 ("[I]t has never been legal for a
corporation to practice law.").
39. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. L. ch. 292, §§ 1-3 (1916); 1917 R.I. ACTS & RESOLVES ch. 1494, § 2.
New York's statute, which was typical, prohibited corporations from practicing law, rendering legal
services, giving legal advice, furnishing attorneys to provide legal services, or advertising or soliciting
legal business. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 280 (Consol. 1909); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 2-a (Consol.
1909).
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stopped corporations from employing salaried lawyers to provide legal ser-
vices to third parties and turn over the fees to the corporation. The ban on
corporate law practice thus cut off one avenue through which nonlawyers
might have shared fees.
The hostility to the corporate practice of law was explained in In re
Co-operative Law Company:"°
The relation of attorney and client. . . cannot exist between an at-
torney employed by a corporation to practice law for it, and a client
of the corporation, for he would be subject to the directions of the
corporation and not to the directions of the client . . . .The corpo-
ration would control the litigation, the money earned would belong
to the corporation and the attorney would be responsible to the cor-
poration only.4
New York was not alone in condemning the practice of law by corpora-
tions. By 1935, nearly half the states had passed laws prohibiting corpora-
tions from furnishing lawyers for profit.' 2
In 1925, the ABA ruled that lawyers were also ethically forbidden to
share fees with nonprofit organizations. A local bar asked whether attor-
neys could accept employment with an auto club to serve club members.'
The attorneys were salaried and did not charge members for legal ser-
vices. Although the Canons of Professional Ethics did not yet prohibit fee
sharing with nonlawyers, the ABA relied on Co-operative Law and simi-
lar holdings against the "practice of law" by corporations, denouncing the
relationship as "a division of professional fees with a lay agency' "4
whether or not the club was organized for profit.45
In 1928, the ABA formalized its opposition to fee sharing by adopting
Canon 34, which directly prohibited fee sharing with nonlawyers. It pro-
vided that "[n]o division of fees for legal services is proper, except with
40. 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910). A lower court had originally found that Co-operative was
"lawfully engaged" in business and had granted approval, but the chairman of the Brooklyn Bar
Association's grievance committee soon moved to vacate the order of approval. After a hearing, the
court vacated its prior approval. The New York Court of Appeals affirmed.
41. 198 N.Y. at 483-84, 92 N.E. at 16 (emphasis added).
42. See Wormser, Corporations and the Practice of Law, 5 FORDHAM L. REV. 207, 207, 218
(1936) (citing statutes and arguing that "to exclude corporations entirely from the practice of the law
is idle, impractical, and adopts a too narrow view of the important business and social
considerations").
43. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 8 (1925), reprinted
in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCES 71 (1957).
44. Id. at 75 (emphasis added).
45. Id. at 74. The organization's members did not receive any direct monetary benefit from the
legal services, but the ABA said that "the club as an entity may profit from this particular activity to
the benefit of its other activities and the membership thereby receive an indirect benefit or profit." Id.
The opinion intentionally did not state whether the auto club itself was organized for profit, because
the Committee believed that the club's plan was forbidden under the Canons "[e]ven if the club is not
organized for profit." Id.
19891 1079
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 98: 1069
another lawyer, based upon a division of service or responsibility."4 This
prohibition was designed to halt law practice by large banks that could
"grab off all the legal business in the community,147 and was probably
also aimed at ambulance chasers whose abusive practices were publicized
during extensive hearings and investigations in both New York"8 and
Philadelphi 9 in 1928.
The bar's intolerance for fee sharing with nonlawyers has not changed
since the adoption of Canon 34. Curiously, however, courts virtually ig-
nored Canon 34 in connection with nonprofit organizations.50 The courts
continued to condemn fee sharing, but seldom cited Canon 34. Instead,
they relied on the older Canon 28, which forbade the payment of any
compensation for securing cases,5 1 and on a new Canon 35, adopted by
the ABA at the same time as Canon 34, which prohibited lawyers em-
46. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 34 (1928). Another new canon, Canon 35, rein-
forced the fee-sharing prohibition by providing that a lawyer employed by an association, club, or
other organization could not "render legal services ...to the members of such an organization in
respect to their individual affairs." Id. Canon 35. One purpose of Canon 35 was to stifle the "com-
mercialization of the practice of law" that was thought to occur when lawyers working for nonprofit
groups advertised that they provided legal services. See 51 REPORTS A.B.A. 82-83 (1926) (report of
Committee on Professional Ethics and Grievances).
Neither Canon 34 nor Canon 35 provided an exception for nonprofit organizations. An angry mi-
nority report therefore opposed Canon 35, arguing that it would "condemn many organizations which
meet, in a perfectly legitimate and convenient manner, a need of the public." 52 REPORTS A.B.A. 390
(1927).
47. See 51 REPORTS A.B.A. 82-83 (1926) (report of Committee on Professional Ethics and
Grievances). The leading application of the new canons to a bank was People v. People's Stock Yards
State Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 176 N.E. 901 (1931). For several years, the bank's lawyers had helped the
bank's customers with wills, real estate transactions, and foreclosures. The bank's lawyers charged
their regular fees and turned them all over to the bank, so the bank turned a handsome profit. The
Illinois court enjoined the practice, held the bank in contempt of court, and fined it $1000. 344 Ill. at
479-80, 176 N.E. at 908-09.
48. See People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin, 248 N.Y. 465, 162 N.E. 487 (1928). Justice Cardozo
wrote: "'Ambulance chasing' was spreading to a demoralizing extent .... Retainers, often on ex-
travagant terms, were solicited and paid for. Calendars became congested through litigations main-
tained without probable cause as weapons of extortion." 248 N.Y. at 468, 162 N.E. at 488.
49. See Report of the Committee of Censors to the Law Association of Philadelphia: In re Contin-
gent Fee Accident Litigation, reprinted in 14 MAsS. L.Q. 1 (Supp. 1928) [hereinafter Philadelphia
Report]. The Philadelphia story was a sordid tale about personal injury lawyers paying vast networks
of runners, police officers, ambulance drivers, doctors, nurses, hospital switchboard operators, and
others to locate or solicit personal injury suits. Sharing contingent fees was one of the main currencies
for purchasing claims. Id. at 14-15. To combat the abuses, the Philadelphia Bar recommended adop-
tion and strict enforcement of a flat prohibition on fee sharing. Id. at 22 (recommending that "no
attorney shall, directly or indirectly, divide his fee with" nonlawyer).
50. Both the courts and the bar, however, remained vigilant about invoking Canon 34 against fee
sharing with nonlawyers for profit. See, e.g., Application of Guberman, 90 Ariz. 27, 363 P.2d 617
(1961) (en banc) (fee splitting with person not admitted to practice law is clearly violation of Canon
34 and tends to show lack of moral character); In re Introcaso, 26 N.J. 353, 140 A.2d 70 (1958)
(attorney violated Canon 34 by dividing fees with nonlawyer runner who solicited cases); AMERICAN
BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS 150-52 (1967) (sum-
marizing more than one dozen ABA opinions under Canon 34 between 1928 and 1967).
51. See In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933) (without mentioning Canon 34, court
censured lawyer under Canons 28 and 35 for having clients agree to pay part of recovery to lawyer
and part to trainmen's union); In re Petition of Comm. on Rule 28, 29 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 291, 298-303
(1932) (without mentioning Canon 34, court found that fee splitting arrangement between lawyer and
legal department of trainmen's union violated Canons 27, 28, and 35); supra text accompanying note
36 (quoting Canon 28).
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ployed by "intermediaries" (including nonprofit groups) from rendering
legal services for third parties.5" In the early 1930's, the bar launched a
nationwide "war" against the unauthorized practice of law,"3 and the re-
ceipt of any share of legal fees (or even the mere hiring of a staff attorney)
was considered proof that a nonprofit group was "practicing law.""
The bar's crusade against unauthorized practice continued throughout
the 1950's and into the 1960's. 5 During the 1960's and 1970's, however,
the Supreme Court decided a series of cases that gave nonprofit groups the
First Amendment right to solicit and finance cases, refer matters to spe-
cific lawyers, and hire staff attorneys.56 These cases virtually erased the
canon concerning intermediaries, and they sharply limited state power to
prosecute nonprofit groups for the unauthorized practice of law.57 One of
these cases, In re Primus,58 suggests that the Court might strike down the
blanket prohibition on fee sharing between lawyers and public interest
organizations if the issue were squarely presented.5" But neither Primus
nor any other Supreme Court case has definitely approved fee sharing
with public interest groups, 0 and the Court has twice declined opportuni-
52. See 53 REPoRTs A.B.A. 120-30 (1928) (debate in ABA House of Delegates over new canons,
including Canons 34 and 35, culminating in their adoption); supra notes 46 (discussing Canon 35,
which restricted use of "intermediaries") & 51 (citing cases).
53. See Rhode, supra note 37, at 3, 6-11 (recounting history of bar's unauthorized practice
campaign).
54. See, e.g., Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers, 35 Ill. 2d 112, 117, 219 N.E.2d
503, 506 (1966) ("[O]rganizations, including not-for-profit organizations, which hire or retain law-
yers to represent their individual members in legal matters are ordinarily engaging in the unautho-
rized practice of law."), rev'd, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967) (holding that unions have constitutional
right to hire attorneys to assist individual members); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Automobile Serv.
Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935) (voluntary association's collection of dues to finance various
legal services without further charge to members constituted unauthorized practice of law).
55. See Rhode, supra note 37, at 8-9 (discussing bar's activities between 1930 and 1960).
56. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (lawyer may solicit cases for civil rights group that
may benefit financially from fee award); United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576 (1971)
(labor union may recommend specific attorneys to its members and limit their fees); United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967) (holding that labor union has First Amend-
ment right to hire attorneys to serve its members in their individual cases); Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (labor union has right to recom-
mend specific attorneys to its injured members); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (civil rights
group has First Amendment right to recommend and pay specific attorneys to bring school desegrega-
tion suits on behalf of member and nonmember plaintiffs). For detailed discussions of these cases, see
infra text accompanying notes 270-316.
57. In United Mine Workers, the Supreme Court overturned a state court holding that hiring an
attorney to serve union members constituted an unauthorized practice of law. See 389 U.S. at 221-25.
The Button case expressly rejected a state court holding that the NAACP's activities violated Canon
35 (governing intermediaries) and Canon 47 (barring lawyers from assisting unauthorized practice of
law). See 371 U.S. at 424-26 & n.8 (quoting Canons 35 & 47).
58. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
59. The general principles articulated in Primus suggest that the Court would recognize a First
Amendment right of attorneys to share fees with public interest groups if the issue were squarely
presented, but Primus itself did not discuss the fee-sharing rule, and thus left open the precise issues
addressed in this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 305-11 (distinguishing Primus).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 300-11.
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ties to approve fee-sharing arrangements between lawyers and labor
61unions.
When the ABA adopted the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
in 1969,12 Disciplinary Rule 3-102(A) provided: "A lawyer or law firm
shall not share fees with a nonlawyer."65 But not everyone shared the
bar's views. The Kutak Commission, a special commission appointed in
1976 to recommend revisions to the 1969 Code, suggested that the fee-
sharing rule be substantially relaxed. Specifically, the Kutak Commission
proposed that lawyers be allowed to share fees with nonlawyers, even in
profit-making enterprises, if the nonlawyers agreed not to influence the
attorneys' independent professional judgment and to abide by the rules of
legal ethics regarding confidentiality, solicitation, and legal fees.6"
The Commission's proposal to allow fee sharing attracted little contro-
versy or comment for several years.6" But when the ABA House of Dele-
gates debated a final draft of the Model Rules, a delegate asked the Com-
mission's Reporter whether the proposed rule would "permit a business
corporation such as Sears Roebuck or H & R Block to open law offices
staffed by salaried lawyers in shopping centers across the country."68 The
Reporter said that it would. 7 The debate that followed was intense and
61. See infra text accompanying notes 300-04.
62. Effective January 1, 1970, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility replaced the ABA's
Canons of Professional Ethics. See AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY xi (1979) (explaining legislative history of Code).
63. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 3-102(A). Three narrow exceptions involved deceased law-
yers, retired lawyers, and retirement plans for law firm employees. Id. Only the retirement plan
exception has any conceivable relevance for the purposes of this Article. See infra text accompanying
notes 88-89 (discussing exception for compensation and retirement plans).
64. The Kutak Commission's Proposed Final Draft of Rule 5.4, which was expressly intended to
replace the rule against fee sharing with nonlawyers (and several other rules that excluded nonlawy-
ers from the legal business), provided:
A lawyer may be employed by an organization in which a financial interest is held or mana-
gerial authority is exercised by a nonlawyer . . . such as a business corporation, insurance
company, legal services organization or government agency, but only if:
(a) there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with
the client-lawyer relationship;
(b) information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule 1.6;
(c) the organization does not engage in advertising or personal contact with prospective cli-
ents if a lawyer employed by the organization would be prohibited from doing so by Rule 7.2
or 7.3; and
(d) the arrangement does not result in charging a fee that violates Rule 1.5.
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, THE LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN THE ABA
HOUSE OF DELEGATES 159-60 (1987) (emphasis added). By holding a financial interest in an organi-
zation, nonlawyers could have shared in legal fees. In any event, the basic prohibition against fee
sharing would have been completely eliminated.
65. G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 469 (1986) [hereinafter HAZARD & HODES, THE LAW OF
LAWYERING].
66. Transcript of floor debate by ABA House of Delegates, HOD Tape 10, at 28 (Feb. 8, 1983)
[hereinafter Transcript] (question of Robert Hawkins, former President of Missouri Bar).
67. Id. at 29. The Kutak Commission's Reporter was Professor Geoffrey Hazard, Jr. of the Yale
Law School.
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impassioned. 8 In the end, the proposal to allow fee sharing with
nonlawyers became "the only proposed Rule to suffer total rejection" in
the House of Delegates. 9 In its place, the ABA adopted an amendment 7°
that continued the existing ban on fee sharing verbatim. 7' The net result
is that every state now prohibits fee sharing with nonlawyers.
B. Scope of the Rule Against Fee Sharing
Nearly all public interest organizations require staff attorneys to turn
over all court-awarded fees, and many public interest organizations re-
quire cooperating attorneys to turn over all or part of their fees.72 Do
these agreements violate the rule against fee sharing with nonlawyers?
The fee-sharing rule has two sweeping components. The first, which
applies to both staff and cooperating attorneys, is that lawyers may not
share fees with nonlawyers who perform services for them-they may not
pay nonlawyers a share of the fees rather than a fixed salary or wage.
The most common example of this prohibition is that lawyers may not
share fees with nonlawyers as payment for soliciting and referring cases. 3
68. See, e.g., id. at 33 (delegate noting that "there is one California law firm widely advertised,
with offices in many states, perhaps some of yours, that intends to go public if this House should
adopt Rule 5.4"); id. at 36 (delegate decried proposal as "demeaning to the profession"); id. at 37-39
(speech by delegate from General Practice Section in favor of that Section's amendment maintaining
status quo); id. at 42 (delegate asked: "[Who is in trouble if there is a violation of these [proposed]
rules? Is it the [lay] venturer or the lawyer? It's the lawyer; the venturer isn't even under the
jurisdiction.").
69. HAZARD & HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 65, at 469.
70. The amendment was proposed by the General Practice Section. See Transcript, supra note
66, at 37. The membership of the General Practice Section consists primarily of lawyers in relatively
small firms, which would be greatly threatened by the expansion of firms such as Hyatt Legal Ser-
vices and Jacoby & Meyers.
71. Compare MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 5.4(a) with MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 3-
102(A). One delegate damned the status quo as "the cave man and woman mentality." Transcript,
supra note 66, at 43. But another delegate praised it, saying, "I think we should live with what we
have because it's been good enough in the past." Id. at 44.
The Kutak Commission's proposals were briefly resurrected in 1986, when both the North Dakota
and District of Columbia bars proposed versions of Rule 5.4 very much like the defeated Kutak
proposal. See Kaplan, Want to Invest in a Law Firm?, Nat'l L.J., Jan. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 4. The
North Dakota Supreme Court, however, rejected its bar's proposal, instead adopting Model Rule 5.4.
See [2 Current Reports] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) No. 23, at 462 (Dec. 10, 1986).
The D.C. Bar's proposal is still pending, see Glaser, Court Set to Act on Bar's Ethics Proposal, Legal
Times, June 27, 1988, at 20, col. I (noting that D.C. Court of Appeals has been deliberating on
proposals since 1986), but the D.C. Bar has substantially trimmed back its original proposal (which
mirrored the Kutak Commission's language). The current proposal would allow fee sharing only with
nonlawyers who perform professional services that assist an organization in rendering legal services to
clients. See Gilbert & Lempert, The Nonlawyer Partner: Modest Proposals Deserve A Chance, 2
GEo. J. LEGAL ETHics 383, 398-400 (1988) (explaining D.C. Bar's retrenchment from its original
proposal).
72. See supra text accompanying note 18.
73. See, e.g., In re Pyle, 363 N.W.2d 303, 304 (Minn. 1985) (lawyer disciplined for paying fees
to nonlawyer employees of firm for referring cases to firm); In re Lebowitz, 67 A.D.2d 240, 241, 414
N.Y.S.2d 735, 736 (1979) (lawyer disciplined for sharing legal fees with nonlawyer as inducement to
refer criminal cases to firm); In re Bregg, 61 N.J. 476, 477, 295 A.2d 360, 361 (1972) (lawyer
suspended for paying share of fees to nonlawyer to refer cases). For more examples, see supra text
accompanying notes 30-34. For a discussion of possible exceptions for public interest groups, see infra
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Conceptually, one could say that staff attorneys and cooperating attorneys
are sharing fees with public interest organizations to pay the groups for
soliciting and referring cases, which violates the literal language of Rule
5.4(a).
The second component of the fee-sharing rule, which applies only to
staff attorneys, is that lawyers may not share fees with nonlawyers who
employ them-they may not give nonlawyers a share of the fees in ex-
change for a fixed salary. Thus, lawyers on salary from a corporation
may not allow the corporation to charge third parties for the lawyers'
services, 75 nor may the lawyers collect fees and remit them to the corpora-
tion.1 6 Some jurisdictions have ruled that a company's in-house counsel
may not remit fees to the company even if the lawyer won the fees while
representing the employer." By analogy, staff attorneys would appear to
be violating the fee-sharing rule by turning over all fees to the public
interest organizations that employ them.
The breadth of the rule against fee sharing is matched by the strictness
with which it is construed. For example, a lawyer cannot circumvent the
rule by having a client pay part of the fees directly to a nonlawyer. The
courts will look beyond the technical terms of the contract to hold that the
text accompanying notes 90-110 (discussing lawyer referral services).
74. For a discussion of express and implied exceptions to this literal construction of the fee-
sharing rule, see infra text accompanying notes 88-110.
75. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Op. 84-1 (May 18, 1984),
reprinted in [1984-1 Transfer Binder] Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics & Prof. Resp. (UPA)
MA:OPINIONS:4 (it would be "unethical fee-splitting" for bank to bill staff attorney's time to cus-
tomers at more than bank's actual cost for staff attorney's services); Tennessee Supreme Court Comm.
on Ethics, Formal Ops. 83-F-44 & 83-F-44(a) (Apr. 14, 1983) (corporate counsel may not permit
corporation to collect for legal services performed by lawyer), summary printed in [Ethics Opinions]
Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:8108 (1985). In recent years, some states have
adopted an exception that allows lawyers to share legal fees with nonlawyers as part of a compensa-
tion plan. For a discussion of this exception, see infra text accompanying notes 88-89.
76. See, e.g., Arizona State Bar Comm. on Rules of Professional Conduct, Op. 82-18 (Dec. 1,
1982), summary printed in [Ethics Opinions] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:1315
(1984) (lawyer cannot accept employment with corporation to provide paralegal and legal services to
attorneys); Michigan State Bar Comm. on Professional and Judicial Ethics, Op. CI-917 (Apr. 26,
1983), summary printed in [Ethics Opinions] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:4864
(1984) (attorney may not open office in which nonlawyer guarantees lawyer's salary since salary
arrangement would result in improper fee sharing with nonlawyer); Dallas Bar Ass'n Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Op. 1982-3 (July 9, 1982), summary printed in [Ethics Opinions] Law. Man. on Prof.
Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:8405 (1985) (attorney is considered to be sharing legal fees with nonlaw-
yer if employing corporation reaps any benefit, reward, or profit from attorney's provision of legal
services to third parties).
77. See, e.g., PPG Indus., Inc. v. Celanese Polymer Specialties Co., 840 F.2d 1565, 1570 (Fed.
Cir. 1988) (when calculating statutory fee awards to corporation based on services of in-house coun-
sel, courts should base award on corporation's cost plus overhead in connection with in-house coun-
sel's services, rather than market rate for comparable attorneys in private practice, because "implica-
tion of using a private firm market standard is to allow a nonlegal business corporation to use the
services of in-house counsel, and to reap a profit therefrom"); People v. People's Stock Yards State
Bank, 344 Ill. 462, 477, 176 N.E. 901, 908 (1931) (condemning bank's practice of retaining court-
awarded attorney fees based on work done by its legal department in foreclosure suits on loans owned
by bank); Missouri Bar Admin., Formal Op. 43, reprinted in 20 J. Mo. BAR 33 (1964) (salaried
attorney employed by corporation who sues to collect on note owned by corporation may not request
attorney fees if fees will be turned over to corporation).
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lawyer is unethically sharing fees. 8 Moreover, although clients can waive
numerous other ethical rules,7 '9 they cannot waive the prohibition against
sharing fees with nonlawyers.80 Finally-and of cardinal importance
here-Rule 5.4(a) contains no express exception for nonprofit groups.8 l
This is significant because another subsection of the same rule-Rule
5.4(d)-is specifically limited to organizations practicing law "for a
profit." 2 The absence of any parallel limitation in Rule 5.4(a) is consis-
tent with the historical practice of applying the prohibition against fee
sharing to profit and nonprofit organizations alike.
All of these factors-broad range, strict construction, unwaivability, and
lack of any express exception for nonprofit organizations-indicate that
the prohibition against sharing fees with nonlawyers applies to lawyers
working with public interest organizations. If this is true, then staff and
cooperating attorneys cannot agree to share court-awarded fees with pub-
lic interest organizations unless the rule contains an exception.
C. Exceptions to the Rule
1. Are Public Interest Groups "Law Firms"?
The simplest solution to the fee-sharing problem would be to define the
problem away by calling public interest groups "law firms." Unfortu-
nately, this will not help any organization that does not employ staff at-
torneys or that is unwilling to relinquish complete control over all fees to
the staff attorneys. The Model Rules define "firm" or "law firm" to be "a
lawyer or lawyers in a private firm, lawyers employed in the legal depart-
ment of a corporation or other organization and lawyers employed in a
legal services organization."'8 3 For organizations that rely solely on coop-
78. See, e.g., In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 1933) ("no difference in principle"
between contract obligating lawyer to pay one-fourth of 20% fee to union and contract requiring client
to pay 15% to lawyer and 5% directly to union); Committee on Professional Ethics and Conduct v.
Lawler, 342 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1984) (fee agreement between client and lawyer providing for
direct hourly rate payments to paralegal for services rendered by paralegal amounted to improper
division of fees between lawyer and paralegal); In re Petition of Comm. on Rule 28, 29 Ohio N.P.
(n.s.) 291, 303 (1932) (finding no difference between contract obligating lawyer to pay one-fourth of
20% fee to union and contract requiring client to pay 15% to lawyer and 5% directly to union).
79. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.2(c) (lawyer may limit objectives of represen-
tation "if the client consents after consultation"); id. Rule 1.5(e) (lawyer may divide fees with another
lawyer not in same firm "by written agreement with the client"); id. Rule 1.7(a) (lawyer may re-
present client whose interests are directly adverse to another client if "each client consents after con-
sultation"); id. Rule 1.8(a) (lawyer may acquire pecuniary interest adverse to client if "the client
consents in writing thereto").
80. See Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked About Ethics: A Critical View of the
Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 272 (1985) ("Rule 5.4 envisions no opportunity for client
consent.").
81. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 5.4(a).
82. Id. Rule 5.4(d) (prohibiting lawyer from practicing "with or in the form of a professional
corporation or association authorized to practice law for a profit" if nonlawyer owns any interest, is
officer or director, or "has the right to direct or control the professional judgment of a lawyer").
83. Id. terminology section (preceding Rule 1.1) (emphasis added). The Model Code is more
restrictive; it defines "law firm" to include "a professional legal corporation," which is separately
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erating attorneys and do not employ any staff attorneys, this definition
offers no consolation.8
Even for organizations that do employ staff attorneys, the definition in
the Rules poses difficulties. Since only the lawyers in the organization
constitute a law firm, any legal fees that accrue based on their work can-
not be shared with anyone except other lawyers in the organization.85 In
other words, all legal fees must either be distributed to the lawyers per-
sonally or placed in a segregated account controlled by lawyers.8" This
requirement of exclusive lawyer control over all legal fees is likely to
cause a problem for many public interest groups. Staff attorneys are by
definition employees of the organization, and the nonlawyer officers or
directors of the organization may not be willing to give staff attorneys
complete control over such significant sums of money. If the nonlawyers
are willing to give up control over the money, then the definitional solu-
tion may work. The staff attorneys will be sharing fees only within the
"law firm," so there will be no fee sharing with nonlawyers. But if the
nonlawyers in the organization desire control over the disposition of the
fees, the definitional solution will not work. Once the staff attorneys as-
sume control over the fees, the organization will lose the right to insist
that the fees be applied to the organization's general purposes. The attor-
neys may use the money for virtually any purpose they wish17-including
defined as "a corporation . . . authorized by law to practice law for profit." MODEL CODE, supra
note 5, definitions section (following DR 9-102). The Code also defines a "qualified legal assistance
organization" as "an office or organization of one of the four types listed in DR 2-103(D)(1)-(4),
inclusive that meets all the requirements thereof." Id. (footnote omitted). One of the requirements of
DR 2-103(D)(1)-(4) is that the organization "is so organized and operated that no profit is derived
by it from the rendition of legal services by lawyers." Id. DR 2-103(D)(4)(a). Since public interest
groups are not authorized to practice law for a profit, they cannot qualify as a "law firm" under the
Code. Yet since they derive a "profit" by sharing in market rate legal fees, they also do not meet the
definition of a qualified legal assistance organization. Thus, the Code does not provide any defini-
tional solution to the problem.
84. In my empirical survey, I found that approximately 50% of all ACLU affiliates and 15% of
other public interest groups do not employ any staff attorneys. These groups depend entirely on coop-
erating attorneys for their legal work.
85. The rules place no restrictions on sharing fees with other lawyers in the same firm. See
MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.5(e) ("[a] division of a fee between lawyers who are not in the
same firm may be made only if" division of fees satisfies certain criteria; but rule makes no mention of
sharing fees among lawyers in same firm (emphasis added)). Of course, fees may be shared with
nonlawyers if the fee-sharing plan fits within one of the exceptions discussed in Sections I-C and II-B.
86. A separate account controlled by the lawyers parallels the usual arrangement in private law
firms, where all fees are typically deposited in an account used by the law firm to cover lawyer
employment costs, nonlawyer employment costs, and a variety of other operating expenses. See M.
ALTMAN & R. WELL, How TO MANAGE YOUR LAW OFFICE § 11.10 (1988) (describing typical law
firm system of accounts).
87. The rules of legal ethics place only a few restrictions on the ways in which lawyers may agree
to use their fees. The rules restrict the rights of lawyers to acquire business interests adverse to a
client, provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending litigation, offer an unlawful
inducement to a witness for testimony, pay for recommendations or referrals, share fees with
nonlawyers or with lawyers not in the same firm, or use fees for purposes that are criminal, dishonest,
fraudulent, deceitful, or prejudicial to the administration of justice. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5,
Rules 1.5(e), 1.8(a) & (e), 3.4(b), 5.4(a), 8.4(b)-(d). Beyond that, the rules of legal ethics do not
specifically address or limit the uses to which lawyers may put their fees. Lawyers may thus agree to
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the organization's nonlitigation program-but the lawyers must be in sole
control of the funds. Since this may pose a problem for many organiza-
tions, we must see whether the rules provide some other exception.
2. Compensation Plans for Nonlawyer Employees
The fee-sharing rule has only one express exception worth discussing.
Rule 5.4(a)(3) provides that "a lawyer or law firm may include nonlaw-
yer employees in a compensation or retirement plan, even though the plan
is based in whole or in part on a profit-sharing arrangement. 88 Under
this provision, lawyers may apparently agree to base the compensation of
their employees on the amount of fees the lawyers earn. But this exception
is unhelpful to public interest organizations because nonlawyers ordinarily
are not "employees" of the lawyers. Cooperating attorneys are similar to
independent contractors, and they do not employ the nonlawyers at public
interest organizations. Staff attorneys are typically employees, not
employers.
To take advantage of the compensation plan exception, many public
interest organizations would have to restructure their operations so that
staff attorneys would become the employers of all nonlawyers. This is
probably impractical and would in any event be irrelevant with respect to
cooperating attorneys. Perhaps sophisticated contracts could divert some
fee awards to nonlawyers under the compensation plan exception, but this
does not represent a simple or global solution to the problem. 9
3. Referral Fees
Another possible avenue around the fee-sharing rule is ABA Model
Rule 7.2(c), which states: "A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a
person for recommending the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer...
may pay the usual charges of a not-for-profit lawyer referral service or
other legal service organization.90 The comparable Code provision says
that a lawyer may "request referrals from a lawyer referral service oper-
spend their fees for any legitimate purpose, including any of the legitimate activities of the organiza-
tion that employs them. However, we must still distinguish between donations and contractual obliga-
tions to share fees. Even though a law firm may donate its money for any legitimate purpose, it may
not contract to share fees with a nonlawyer, no matter how noble the nonlawyer's purpose. See supra
text accompanying note 22.
88. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 5.4(a)(3). The Code contained a virtually identical provi-
sion. See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 3-102(A)(3).
89. The other two express exceptions in Rule 5.4(a) and its substantially identical Code counter-
part, DR 3-102(A), concern only deceased lawyers and are irrelevant to public interest groups. See
supra note 5 (quoting Rule 5.4(a)).
90. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 7.2(c) (emphasis added). The comment to Rule 7.2(c)
does not discuss or explain this language. Under California's newly revised ethical rules, the referral
service exception is part of the rule prohibiting fee sharing with nonlawyers. See CALIFORNIA RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1-320(A)(4) (1989) (rule entitled "Financial Arrangements With
Non-Lawyers" provides that lawyer "may pay a prescribed registration, referral, or participation fee
to a lawyer referral service").
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ated, sponsored, or approved by a bar association and may pay its fees
incident thereto."" 1 A related provision allows a lawyer to be "recom-
mended, employed, or paid by . .. [a]ny bona fide organization that rec-
ommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to its members or benefi-
ciaries" as long as the organization derived "no profit" from the rendition
of legal services.9"
Groups such as the ACLU or the NAACP are legal service organiza-
tions within the meaning of Rule 7.2(c), and are "bona fide" organiza-
tions that recommend, furnish, or pay for legal services within the mean-
ing of the Code.93 The difficult question is whether a lawyer's ethical
right to pay the "usual charges" or "fees incident to" a legal service or-
ganization encompasses the right to enter into a fee-sharing agreement
with a public interest organization. Do these terms imply an exception to
the fee-sharing rule allowing contracts to share fees with public interest
groups?"' The Rules and the Code do not answer these questions,95 but a
few cases and ethics opinions shed some light on them.
91. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-103(C)(1) (footnote omitted). That section is generally
irrelevant to lawyers working with public interest organizations, however, since such organizations are
not ordinarily operated, sponsored, or formally approved by bar associations. California, however, has
adopted standards for approving lawyer referral services. See CALIFORNIA RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1-600(B) (1989) ("The Board of Governors of the State Bar shall formulate and
adopt Minimum Standards for Lawyer Referral Services, which. . . shall be binding on members.").
92. MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-103(D)(4). The Code also requires that there be "no
interference with the exercise of independent professional judgment" on behalf of the lawyer's client,
id. DR 2-103(D), and (perhaps redundantly) that "[t]he member or beneficiary to whom the legal
services are furnished, and not such organization, is recognized as the client of the lawyer in the
matter," id. DR 2-103(D)(4)(d).
93. The Model Rules define a number of terms, but they do not define "legal services organiza-
tion." See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 5, terminology section (immediately preceding Rule 1.1). The
comment to Rule 7.2 does not even use that phrase. See id. Rule 7.2 comment ("[A] lawyer may
participate in not-for-profit lawyer referral programs and pay the usual fees charged by such pro-
grams."). The Model Rules commentary says that DR 2-103(D) "referred to legal aid and other
legal services organizations." See id. Rule 7.2 comparison section (emphasis added). In fact, however,
DR 2-103(D) does not refer to "legal services organizations" per se. Rather, DR 2-103(D) refers to
"[a]ny bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes, or pays for legal services to its members or
beneficiaries." See MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-103(D)(4). The meaning of that language is
therefore important to understanding the phrase "legal services organization" in Model Rule 7.2(c).
The Code does not define a "bona fide organization that recommends, furnishes or pays for legal
services," but a footnote cites United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); and
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (all of which are discussed infra text accompanying notes
270-85). MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-103(D)(4) n.87. Citations to these cases suggest that the
drafters had a broad range of nonprofit organizations in mind, including public interest groups like
the NAACP.
94. If the exception were explicit, Rule 5.4(a) would say: "A lawyer serving as a staff attorney or
cooperating attorney for a not-for-profit lawyer referral service, public interest organization, or other
legal services organization may share with the organization all or part of any court-awarded attorney
fees based on the performance of legal services for clients referred or sponsored by the organization."
The exception might also depend on certain conditions, such as those proposed by the Kutak Commis-
sion. See supra note 64 (paras. (a)-(d)).
95. The comment to Rule 7.2(c) says only that "a lawyer may participate in not-for-profit lawyer
referral programs and pay the usual fees charged by such programs." MODEL RuLEs, supra note 5,
Rule 7.2(c) comment. The Ethical Considerations to Canon 2 of the Code do not define or explain the
word "profit" in DR 2-103(D), but in this context it is logical to define it as the excess of returns over
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In Formal Opinion 291,96 and again in Informal Opinion 1076,97 the
ABA stated that a bar association's lawyer referral service may ethically
require referral panel members to pay a reasonable percentage of the fees
that the lawyers collect in referred cases. In line with these opinions, at
least forty state and local bar associations require attorneys to give their
lawyer referral services a percentage of their fees.98
Nevertheless, some lawyers have voiced concern that these percentage-
of-the-fee requirements violate the prohibition against fee splitting with
nonlawyers."9 These ethical concerns generated litigation in Emmons,
Williams, Mires & Leech v. State Bar.°0 There, an attorney registered
with a bar's lawyer referral service and agreed to give the service one-
third of any resulting fees. 101 After collecting a $48,000 fee on a malprac-
tice referral, however, the lawyer decided that the arrangement "would
constitute fee-splitting with an unlicensed person."1°2 Citing ABA ap-
proval of fee sharing as a method of financing lawyer reference services,10 3
the court rejected this argument: "The bar association seeks not individual
profit but the fulfillment of public and professional objectives. It has a
legitimate, nonprofit interest in making legal services more readily availa-
ble to the public."10
Read broadly, this rationale applies equally to nonprofit public interest
organizations because their goal is also to make legal services more readily
available to the public, not to let individuals profit by sharing referral
fees. But when read more critically, it does not fully apply to public inter-
est groups because they take a much more active role than referral services
expenditures in a given transaction or series of transactions. To the extent that a fee award exceeds an
organization's cost of providing a staff or cooperating attorney, the organization would derive a
"profit" from the rendition of legal services.
96. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 291 (1956), reprinted in
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND
GRIEVANCES 624 (1957). The opinion interpreted the term "lawyer" in Canon 34, which provided
that no division of fees for legal services was proper except with "another lawyer." Since a referral
service is not "another lawyer," the opinion apparently expresses an implied exception to the rule
against fee sharing, based on the bar's duty to make legal services more widely available to the public.
See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 205 (1940), reprinted in AMER-
ICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, OPINIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND GRIEV-
ANCES 416, 418 (1957) (recognizing "an obligation of the profession [to provide] competent legal
services to persons in low-income groups at fees within their ability to pay").
97. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Informal Op. 1076 (Oct. 8, 1968), reprinted in INFOR-
MAL OPINIONS OF THE COMMITrEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (ABA) (1969).
98. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LAWYER REFERRAL AND INFORMATION SERVICE COM-
MIrrEE, REFERENCE HANDBOOK 41-42 (1986) (listing 48 bar association referral services having fee-
sharing arrangements); LRS In a Time of Change, B. LEADER, May-June 1982, at 4-5.
99. LRS In a Time of Change, B. LEADER, May-June 1982, at 5-6 (reporting fee-sharing con-
cerns in Florida and Ohio).
100. 6 Cal. App. 3d 565, 86 Cal. Rptr. 367 (1970).
101. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 568, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
102. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 567-68, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
103. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 572 n.5, 573-74, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 371 n.5, 371-73 (citing ABA Formal
Op. 291 and California's Minimum Standards for a Lawyer Reference Service in California).
104. 6 Cal. App. 3d at 574, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 372-73.
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in soliciting clients and retaining involvement in the cases. Thus, the op-
portunity and temptation to increase a share of the fees is a greater danger
for public interest organizations than for bar-operated referral services.
Perhaps for these reasons, some recent ethics opinions suggest that non-
profit lawyer referral services not sponsored by bar associations cannot
ethically receive a share of the legal fees from referred cases. A 1985 in-
formal ABA ethics opinion, for example, considered a religious corpora-
tion's proposal to establish a nonprofit "national network" of lawyers in-
terested in providing legal services to missionaries and their dependents."0 5
The ABA concluded that the plan was proper under Rule 7.2(c) "pro-
vided there is no sharing of legal fees with the Organization and no in-
terference with the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering legal ser-
vices to the client."'10 A 1985 District of Columbia ethics opinion echoes
these themes.1 0 7
While pertinent, these opinions fail to address several elements common
to fee-sharing arrangements between lawyers and public interest organi-
zations. These missing elements cut in opposite directions. On the one
hand, the lawyer referral services opinions do not consider situations in
which staff or cooperating attorneys agree to pay over all of their fees to
the organizations. Yet the phrases "usual charges" and "incidental fees"
cannot mean all fees resulting from referred cases,' 0 8 and the highest per-
centage currently charged by any bar-operated referral service is only
twenty-five percent.'0 9 On the other hand, the referral service opinions do
not discuss court-awarded attorney fees, whose public policy implications
favor public interest groups."° Since the rules themselves do not provide
any clear exception for public interest groups, we must ask whether the
fee-award statutes themselves provide an avenue around the fee-sharing
rule.
105. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1512 (Mar. 26, 1985),
reprinted in [Ethics Opinions] Law. Man. on Prof. Conduct (ABA/BNA) 801:368 (1985). The or-
ganization's plan was to contact potential clients to promote the referral service, and to give the names
of registered lawyers to those wishing to use the service. See id. at 368-69.
106. Id. at 369 (citing Rule 5.4(a), (c)) (emphasis added). The ABA also concluded that the
proposed plan would not violate DR 2-103. Id. at 369-70.
107. See D.C. Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 155 (June 18, 1985), reprinted in [1987-
1 Transfer Binder] Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics & Prof. Resp. (UPA) DC:OPINIONS:3.
108. The ABA has permitted lawyers to pay referral services only a "reasonable" percentage of
their fees. See supra text accompanying notes 90-98.
109. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION LAWYER REFERRAL AND INFORMATION SERVICE COM-
MITTEE, REFERENCE HANDBOOK 41-42 (1986) (describing fee-sharing arrangements used by state
and local bar association lawyer referral services). The highest figure, 25%, is charged by the Bar
Association of San Francisco Lawyer Referral Service, and applies only to contingent fee recoveries of
$20,000 or more. Id. at 41. In the Emmons case, which reviewed two surveys of bar association
referral services in the 1960's, the court found that the one-third referral fee at issue was "the highest
in the United States." 6 Cal. App. 3d at 574, 86 Cal. Rptr. at 373.
110. See infra text accompanying note 143.
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II. THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES
The rule against fee sharing developed long before federal fee-shifting
statutes began to play a prominent role in public interest litigation."' Be-
cause federal statutes implicate the supremacy clause, and because courts
have crafted a special rule to address fee sharing between staff attorneys
and nonprofit groups, we need to explore the effect of federal fee-shifting
statutes on the fee-sharing rule.
A. The Supremacy Clause
Under the supremacy clause of the Constitution," 2 federal laws take
precedence over any conflicting state laws." 3 Therefore, if federal fee-
shifting provisions mandate fee awards directly to public interest groups
that provide counsel, or if Congress clearly intended that the fee-shifting
provisions would override the rule against fee sharing, then the states
could not prohibit attorneys from sharing fees with public interest groups.
Unfortunately, the cases and legislative history on the relationship be-
tween fee-shifting statutes and the fee-sharing rule are inconclusive. Both
before and since the passage of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards
Act of 1976 n" (section 1988), for example, courts have issued conflicting
decisions about who is to receive fee awards when public interest groups
provide counsel.
In Wilderness Society v. Morton,"5 an en bane opinion written by the
late J. Skelly Wright, three environmental groups had won a suit to block
construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline. Congress had not yet passed a
fee-shifting provision for environmental suits, but the court awarded fees
under the common law "private attorney general" doctrine."' However,
the court expressly awarded the fees to the staff attorneys, not to the
groups that employed them. In the court's view, this procedure avoided
"all problems of whether the organization might, by receiving an award
directly, be involved in the unauthorized practice of law.""17
111. See supra text accompanying notes 25-71.
112. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (providing that "the laws of the United States ... shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding").
113. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497, 501-10 (1956) (describing analytical frame-
work); see also Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2314 (1988) (holding that Wisconsin procedural
rule conflicting with federal civil rights laws was void under supremacy clause).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
115. 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (en banc) (holding that federal courts generally cannot
award fees without statutory authority from Congress), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Alyeska
Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soe'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
116. Id. at 1029-30. The reversal of this decision in Alyeska, prompted Congress to enact section
1988.
117. Id. at 1037. The organizations that brought the suit were parties, not just sponsors of the
litigation, but the court believed it had to award fees to the lawyers rather than to the organizations
"whether such organization is a litigating party or a public interest law firm or defense fund." Id.
There was no agreement between the staff attorneys and the organizations concerning fees; the court
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In dictum, the court added that the lawyers could not keep the entire
fee award, because equity required them to reimburse their organizations
for the portion of their salaries and overhead related to the case." 8 But
the court said: "[A]ny amount in excess of such reimbursement belongs to
counsel themselves. That excess may, in whole or in part, be contributed
to the organization involved, or to like causes, or retained by counsel
. . ,"9 The Supreme Court later overturned the fee award in Wilder-
ness Society without reaching the question of who should have received
the fees,"20 but those who oppose fee sharing with public interest groups
still cite Wilderness Society.121
Other courts awarded common law fees directly to public interest
groups. A good illustration is Torres v. Sachs, 22 where the plaintiffs'
lawyers were employed by a nonprofit public interest group, the Puerto
Rican Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc..123 The district court
awarded fees at full market rates 24 directly to the group,125 and the court
of appeals affirmed, noting that "[n]on-profit public interest law firms
have been recognized as properly entitled to attorneys' fees."1' Similarly,
in Fairley v. Patterson,27 attorneys employed by a public interest group
found no reason to believe that the plaintiffs had given "any thought whatever to the possibility of a
fee award." Id. at 1037 n.9. The court also thought staff attorneys should be allowed to keep all of the
fees in excess of the reimbursement level because their salaries were probably "less than they could
have earned on the market in the absence of their dedication to the public interest." Id at 1037. This
rationale is unconvincing. Lawyers accept relatively low salaries from public interest groups because
they derive satisfaction from serving the public interest. Fee awards on top of the salary would thus
unjustly enrich staff attorneys at the expense of the organizations they serve.
118. Id at 1037. The court described the overhead as all expenses normally included in an attor-
ney's fee, such as secretarial services and office supplies.
119. Id; see supra text accompanying note 22. If donations violated the fee-sharing rule, lawyers
could never donate money traceable to their receipt of fees. For lawyers who derive most of their
income from fees, this would preclude nearly all charitable donations.
120. The Court reversed Wilderness Society on the grounds that no fees should have been
awarded to anyone. See Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 269-71. The Alyeska Court did not examine or discuss
the appellate court's allocation of fees between the attorneys and their employers, and nothing in the
opinion endorses (or disputes) the rule allowing attorneys to keep all fees above the organization's
cost.
121. See Devine v. National Treasury Employees Union, 805 F.2d 384, 388-89 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(citing Wilderness Society for proposition that if unions do not establish funds fully supportive of their
litigation activities, court could award fees directly to attorneys), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 67 (1987);
Munsey v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 701 F.2d 976, 977 n.1 (D.C. Cir.)
(citing Wilderness Society for proposition that staff attorneys receiving fee awards personally must
reimburse their employers for expenses, including their salaries), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 851 (1983);
National Treasury Employees Union v. United States Dep't of the Treasury, 656 F.2d 848, 852 &
n.39 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (asserting that obedience to fee-sharing rule is "expressly required" by Wilder-
ness Society).
122. 69 F.R.D. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976).
123. See 538 F.2d at 11 (listing counsel); 69 F.R.D. at 346 (giving counsel's biographies).
124. See 69 F.R.D. at 346 (awarding fees at "'the hourly amount to which attorneys of like skill
in the area would typically be entitled'" (quoting City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448,
471 (2d Cir. 1974))).
125. 69 F.R.D. at 348 (ordering fees "to be paid by defendants to the Puerto Rican Legal De-
fense Fund").
126. 538 F.2d at 13 (citations omitted).
127. 493 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1974).
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successfully challenged a reapportionment plan. The district court denied
fees because the group's staff attorneys had assigned all fees to the
group,12 but the court of appeals reversed, saying: "Whether the attorney
charges a fee or has an agreement that the organization that employs him
will receive any awarded attorneys'fees are not bases on which to deny or
limit attorneys' fees or expenses. 1 29
From the perspective of the policy underlying federal fee-shifting stat-
utes, Torres and Fairley are preferable to Wilderness Society.13 0 If the
fee-sharing rule gave staff attorneys the right to keep all fees exceeding a
group's cost (as Wilderness Society implies), the resulting loss of revenue
might force public interest groups to lay off staff attorneys or pay lower
salaries. Either result might drive many lawyers out of the public interest
sector altogether," 1 making it harder for public interest groups to educate
the public, sponsor cases, file amicus briefs, train cooperating attorneys,
and carry on other activities. Awarding fees directly to public interest
groups (as in Torres) or allowing attorneys to assign fee awards to public
interest groups (as in Fairley) at least diminishes this threat to the prac-
tice of public interest law.
Congress did not expressly consider these implications in passing sec-
tion 1988, but the House report on section 1988 cites Torres and Fairley
with approval in a terse footnote." 2 Citing this footnote, the Supreme
Court stated in New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey3 that "Congress
endorsed such decisions allowing fees to public interest groups when it
was considering, and passed [section 1988].'' But this dictum overstates
Congress' use of Torres and Fairley. The House Report cited those cases
not to support fee awards to public interest organizations, but rather for
the proposition that "a prevailing party is entitled to counsel fees even if
represented by an organization."' 35 This tracks the language of section
1988, which allows courts to award fees only to a prevailing party.",
128. See id. at 605 (quoting unpublished district court opinion).
129. Id. at 607 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). The footnote suggested that denying or limit-
ing statutory fees to nonprofit groups "might raise other issues of constitutional dimension," including
equal protection issues. Id. at 607 n.14. Equal protection issues are beyond the scope of this Article.
130. For a discussion of policy issues from the perspective of legal ethics, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 203-59.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 17-19 (reporting empirical data).
132. See H.R. RaP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 n.16 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
1558]. The report does not cite specific language from either case, so the import of the citations is
ambiguous. The Senate report does not cite Torres or Fairley at all, and never mentions direct awards
to groups or the problem of fee sharing with groups that include nonlawyers. See S. REP. No. 1011,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5908, 5909.
133. 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
134. Id. at 70 n.9 (emphasis added).
135. H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 132, at 8 n.16.
136. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). All other federal fee-shifting statutes likewise award fees to the
prevailing party. No federal fee-shifting statute awards fees directly to the prevailing attorney or
sponsoring organization. See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (appendix to Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (listing more than 100 federal fee-award statutes).
The discussion here does not concern the situation in which public interest groups are actually
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Congress could have allowed fees to the plaintiff's attorney"37 or to the
sponsoring organization,' but Congress chose instead to award fees only
to the prevailing party.
This choice was recently emphasized by the Supreme Court in Evans
v. Jeff D.119 There, a Legal Aid staff attorney challenged the defendant's
right to condition a class action settlement on the plaintiff's waiver of all
fees under section 1988. The Court held that the clients could waive the
right to a fee award because "the language of the Act, as well as its legis-
lative history, indicates that Congress bestowed on the 'prevailing party'
a statutory eligibility for a discretionary award of attorney's fees.'1
40
In dictum, Evans added that parties could assign their fees to their attor-
neys, because Congress never "legislated against assignment of this right
to an attorney."' 4 ' But two key questions remain. If clients do assign their
fees to attorneys, does section 1988 allow attorneys to assign their fees to
public interest organizations even though the assignment violates state eth-
ical rules against fee sharing with nonlawyers? Alternatively, does section
1988 allow clients to assign fee awards directly to organizations, even
though the assignment also technically violates the fee-sharing rule?
1 42
parties to litigation. When a public interest group is itself a party, it may be entitled to fees for
providing its own counsel. Under the Equal Access to Justice Act, for example, tax-exempt nonprofit
organizations that prevail in litigation against the government are expressly eligible for attorney fee
awards. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). But see supra text accompanying
notes 115-19 (under Wilderness Society, even public interest groups acting as parties could not receive
fees directly under the common law private attorney general doctrine).
137. In other contexts, some model acts provided for fees to be awarded directly to attorneys. See,
e.g., UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.201(8) (Official Text 1974) (if creditor has violated Act,
"the court shall award to the consumer the costs of the action and to his attorneys their reasonable
fees" (emphasis added)).
138. Various model acts have advocated awarding fees directly to nonprofit groups. See, e.g.,
MODEL CONSUMER CREDIT ACT § 8.113(3) (National Consumer Law Center 1974 Draft) ("If the
consumer is represented by an attorney employed by a non-profit organization, the organization is
entitled to the same amounts to which a private attorney would be entitled." (emphasis added));
NATIONAL CONSUMER ACT § 5.307(1) (National Consumer Law Center 1st Final Draft 1970) ("If
the consumer is represented by a non-profit organization, . . . the organization shall be awarded a
service fee, in lieu of attorney's fees, equal to the amount of fees a private attorney would be awarded
for the same services." (emphasis added)).
139. 475 U.S. 717 (1986).
140. Id. at 730 (emphasis in original). Justice Brennan vehemently dissented. See id. at 743
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
141. Id. at 731. Thus, a client could properly assign his fee award to a staff or cooperating
attorney for a public interest group.
142. An attorney may have the right to waive a fee entirely, but the attorney cannot nominally
"waive" fees and simultaneously allow the client to assign the "waived" fees to a nonlawyer. That
would enable attorneys to evade the fee-sharing prohibition too easily. See, e.g., In re O'Neill, 5 F.
Supp. 465, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 1933) (lawyer violated rule against fee sharing by having client pay 15% of
recovery to lawyer and 5% directly to union that referred case to lawyer); Committee on Professional
Ethics and Conduct v. Lawler, 342 N.W.2d 486, 488 (Iowa 1984) (lawyer violated rule against fee
sharing by having client pay hourly fees directly to paralegal). Since an agreement that violates the
rules of ethics is void as contrary to public policy, a court could not honor any underlying assignment
of fees to a nonlawyer. See O'Hara v. Ahlgren, Blumenfeld and Kempster, No. 65,760 (Ill. Mar. 29,
1989) (WESTLAW, IL-CS database) (refusing to enforce fee-sharing agreement with nonlawyer on
grounds that agreement violated public policy). See generally J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CON-
TRACTS § 22-1, at 889 (3d ed. 1987) (illegal bargains generally unenforceable). As in Wilderness
Society, lawyers would have to reimburse their employers for their costs, but the lawyers could keep
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Congress never directly addressed these questions. If Congress had ad-
dressed them, I believe it would have allowed parties or their attorneys to
assign fees to public interest groups, whether or not such assignments vio-
late the fee-sharing rule. Such assignments would be consistent with the
principal purpose of section 1988, which was to increase the availability
of lawyers taking civil rights cases.143 But nothing in the legislative history
of section 1988 clearly expresses this intent, and under the Supreme
Court's supremacy clause jurisprudence a statute's broad purpose is not
sufficient to override a state rule. 44 Accordingly, given the ambiguous leg-
islative history and the complete silence in the statutory language, section
1988 apparently will not nullify state ethical rules that forbid assignment
of fees to public interest groups. 45 However, courts have developed an
exception that might allow public interest groups to receive statutory fees
without violating the rule against fee sharing with nonlawyers. That ex-
ception involves separate litigation funds, which are discussed next.
B. Separate Litigation Funds
1. National Treasury Employees Union and Its Progeny
In National Treasury Employees Union v. Department of the Trea-
sury"" (NTEU), a union-sponsored prepaid legal services plan employed
full-time, salaried staff lawyers who had agreed to turn over all court-
awarded fees to the union's general treasury. 47 But when a staff attorney
won a suit for a union member under the Privacy Act, which provided for
a fee award, the district court refused to award fees at prevailing market
the excess or donate it to their employers or to other groups. See supra text accompanying notes
115-19.
143. See H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note 132, at 3 ("[P]rivate lawyers were refusing to take
certain types of civil rights cases because the civil rights bar, already short of resources, could not
afford to do so.").
144. See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 633-34 (1981) (preemption of
state law by federal statutes is not favored unless nature of subject matter allows no other conclusion
or unless Congress has unmistakably so provided). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITU-
TIONAL LAW §2-25, at 479-81 (2d ed. 1988) (noting Court's apparent "overriding reluctance to infer
preemption in ambiguous cases").
145. But courts will scrutinize the allegation of such a purpose to determine whether it truly
reflects congressional intent. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Department of the Treasury,
656 F.2d 848, 855 (D.C. Cir. 1981) ("We do not imply, of course, that Congress could not assign the
considerations at stake values different from those ascribed by the legal profession. It suffices merely
to observe that for cases like the one before us, Congress has not done so.").
146. 656 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1981). An earlier opinion in the same case, Anderson v. Depart-
ment of the Treasury, 648 F.2d 1, 3 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam), had held that "no fee exceeding
the expenses incurred by the union-in terms of attorney's salaries and other out-of-pocket ex-
penses-should be allowed." Shortly thereafter, however, the D.C. Circuit decided a related issue
involving attorney fees in Copeland v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (en banc). The
Anderson panel then decided, sua sponte, to issue "a supplemental opinion elaborating on the princi-
ples underlying [Anderson], and on the limited nature of our holding." NTEU, 656 F.2d at 850. I
discuss only the supplemental opinion.
147. See 656 F.2d at 849; see also id. at 850 ("At oral argument, union counsel told us that the
entire fee recovery would be turned over to their employer [the union].").
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rates. Instead, the court awarded only the union's actual financial outlay
for providing the staff attorney's services.1 8 The court of appeals af-
firmed." 9 If the union received a fee award in excess of the union's actual
costs of providing legal services, the court said, the union would be mak-
ing an unethical "profit" on legal services. 5 This "profit" would violate
the prohibition against sharing fees with nonlawyers15
The NTEU court, however, intended no harm to public interest organi-
zations that depended on court-awarded fees for funding. 5 2 The court
said that its "very narrow" holding would not damage the public interest
bar, and would not affect prior opinions awarding market rate fees di-
rectly to public interest groups." 3 Unlike unions, the court said, public
interest organizations focused strictly on litigation, not on the "diverse op-
erations" funded by unions.1 The rules of legal ethics permitted lawyers
to divide fees with other members of their law firms, and the "same prin-
ciple leaves a salaried attorney at liberty to surrender his fees to a public
interest organization dedicated entirely to litigative activities.1' 55 Market
rate fee awards to public interest organizations would thus be "plowed
back into the litigative programs that made their recovery possible in the
first place." '56
The implication of NTEU is that lawyers may ethically agree to share
market rate legal fees with public interest groups as long as the fees are
used solely to finance more litigation.57 Before a public interest group can
demand that its staff attorneys or cooperating attorneys turn over fees
awarded at market rates, therefore, the group apparently must maintain a
separate "litigation fund." '58
148. See id. at 849 (summarizing unpublished opinion).
149. Because the union was ultimately to receive any fee award, the court viewed the union as the
"real party in interest" and granted the union's motion for substitution as appellant. Id. at 850-51 &
n.23.
150. Id. at 851 (quoting DR 2-103(D)(4)(a), which provides that lawyers cannot work for legal
services organization unless it derives "no profit" by rendering legal services).
151. Id. at 851-52. The court also asserted that profiting from the work of staff attorneys would
involve the union in the unauthorized practice of law. See id. at 852 n.37 (" 'Since a lawyer should
not aid or encourage a layman to practice law, he should not ... share ... fees with a layman.'"
(quoting MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 3-8)).
152. Amici, including the Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, had offered the
"apocalyptic scenario" that refusing to award market rate fees would "destroy the public interest bar
by squeezing out of existence those legal aid organizations that depend on court-awarded ... fees."
656 F.2d at 853 & n.48.
153. Id. at 853-54 & n.49 (citing cases from nine circuits awarding market rate fees to legal aid
offices or public interest organizations). For a discussion of some of the cited cases, see supra text
accompanying notes 122-29.
154. 656 F.2d at 854.
155. Id. (emphasis added).
156. Id.
157. The court also said that full market rate fees would be proper if the fees became the attor-
ney's own money. Id. at 855.
158. Because the National Treasury Employee's Union itself did not maintain a special fund
dedicated solely to litigation, the court did not have to decide whether courts could properly award
market rate fees to nonprofit groups that maintained such funds. The court said only that "perhaps"
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Many opinions have followed NTEU.1" 9 The most important for public
interest organizations is Jordan v. United States Department ofJustice,60
which held that lawyers employed by a law school's clinical program 6 '
were to be awarded fees at full market rates. 62 In a long footnote fre-
quently citing NTEU, the court said:
We assume for purposes of this appeal that, should the Institute
share in any attorneys' fee award beyond recoupment of its own ex-
penses, it will maintain a fund exclusively for litigation, into which
its share will be deposited. . . . [I]t is improper for an entity not
licensed to practice law to partake in attorneys' fees representing the
market value formula. . . where its portion is not to be placed in a
fund dedicated solely to litigation.16 3
An informal Nebraska ethics opinion has followed NTEU and Jordan.
The Nebraska ACLU affiliate, the NCLU, required cooperating lawyers
to turn over thirty-five percent of any fee award in NCLU cases. The
NCLU deposited all fee awards into "a segregated fund" used "exclu-
sively for litigation purposes. "164 In the NCLU's view, this segregated
full market rate fee awards "would withstand criticism when the monies are directed into a fund for
maintenance of a legal services program." Id. But the opinion clearly approved of market rate awards
to lawyers working for public interest organizations that maintained separate funds for litigation.
159. See, e.g., Munsey v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 701 F.2d 976, 977
(D.C. Cir.) ("If attorney fees are awarded to the union itself rather than its attorney, the union can
only recoup the expenses it incurred in supplying services to the client. . . ."), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
851 (1983); Powell v. Department of the Treasury, 8 M.S.P.B. 21, 27 (1981) (where any award of
attorney's fees is forwarded to union under employment contract, union-paid lawyer representing
union member can recover "no more than the actual cost of the union in providing legal services" to
member). Munsey distinguished fees personally awarded to an attorney: "If attorney fees are awarded
to the attorney alone (and not for the union's general treasury), the attorney is entitled to receive the
market value of the services rendered." 701 F.2d at 977 (citing NTEU).
160. 691 F.2d 514 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
161. The program was the Institute for Public Representation, which is affiliated with Ge-
orgetown University Law Center. The court described the Institute as "a qualified clinical program."
Id. at 516 n.14. The court did not explain the word "qualified"; perhaps it meant "bona fide"-that
is, not set up by nonlawyers for the purpose of improperly reaping profits from the practice of law.
See supra note 83 (discussing meaning of "qualified legal assistance organization" in Code).
162. 691 F.2d at 521 (remanding to determine "the rate prevailing in the community for similar
legal work"). The opinion was written by Judge Spottswood Robinson, III, author of the NTEU
opinion.
163. Id. at 516 n.14 (emphasis added, citations omitted). The court went on to say that an entity
without a separate fund "would participate in a long-prohibited division of fees with an attorney" if it
received fees at market rates. Id. Citing Wilderness Society, however, the court said:
[A] market-value award can be made directly to the lawyer who served at the instance of the
organization. The lawyer might then come under an equitable obligation to reimburse the
organization for its expenses, and would be free to donate any part of the fee to the organiza-
tion-just as he could donate monies obtained from other sources.
Id. (citations omitted).
164. Letter from George Green, then President of the NCLU, to Robert Barlow, Advisory Opin-
ion Comm., Nebraska State Bar Ass'n (July 9, 1984) (on file with author). The letter also said that
fees shared with the NCLU could be characterized as "referral fees" permitted under the Nebraska
equivalent of Rule 7.2(c). See also NEBRASKA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLITy DR 2-
103(A) (1983) (containing referral service language modeled on Rule 7.2(c)); Advisory Comm. of the
Nebraska State Bar Ass'n, Op. 83-4 (1983), reprinted in [1984-1 Transfer Binder] Nat'l Rep. on
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fund satisfied the standards in NTEU and Jordan. The state bar ruled
that the fee-sharing arrangement was not unethical."6 5
2. Evaluating the Separate Litigation Fund Concept
The theory underlying separate litigation funds is that "[w]hen fees are
paid into a separate account used solely by lawyers for litigation purposes,
there simply is no fee splitting with a lay entity."1"6 This explanation,
however, confuses ethics and policy. The condition that fees be "used
solely by lawyers" correctly states the requirement of the rules of legal
ethics. Absent any actual use of legal fees by nonlawyers, the rule against
fee sharing is not violated.167
However, the condition that lawyers use the fees "for litigation pur-
poses" is not required by the ethical rules, which place no such restriction
on the ways in which lawyers may use their fees. 68 The "litigation only"
condition in the NTEU line must therefore be based on the policy of the
fee-shifting statutes-to increase the supply of lawyers willing to handle
public interest cases.1 69 But restricting the use of fee awards to litigation
funds is debatable.170 On the one hand, maintaining a separate fund de-
voted exclusively to litigation is not difficult,' 7 ' and many public interest
groups have already created separate litigation funds to receive attorney
fee awards.' A separate fund is basically a bookkeeping entry, and
Legal Ethics & Prof. Resp. (UPA) NE:OPINIONS:10 (lawyer may pay usual charges to nonprofit
lawyer referral service).
165. See Letter from John G. Taylor, NCLU Director, to James Long, ACLU of Florida Execu-
tive Director (July 25, 1988) (on file with author) ("The State Bar Association has determined that
our system of sharing fees is not in violation of DR 2-103." (emphasis in original)). The D.C. Bar's
Legal Ethics Committee reached a similar conclusion in NTEU's original context, ruling that the
prohibition against fee sharing allows market rate fee awards to a union "where market value fees are
placed in a separate fund to be used solely by the union's lawyers to finance legal assistance, even if
the umbrella organization receives some indirect benefit from this arrangement." D.C. Comm. on
Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 176 (Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR LEGAL
ETHICS COMMITTEE OPINIONs 291, 292. The Ethics Committee interpreted the phrase "exclusively
for litigation" in Jordan to include "funds maintained exclusively for legal assistance that involves
legal work other than just litigation." Id. at 291 n.2. It is unclear whether "legal assistance" would
include educational programs, lawyer training, or other nonlitigation activities, but that would be
stretching the term "legal assistance" far beyond its ordinary meaning.
166. Curran v. Department of the Treasury, 805 F.2d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1986) (emphasis
added).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 83-87 (discussing definition of "law firm" in Model
Code and Model Rules).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 86-87 (describing restrictions on use of fees).
169. See supra note 143 (quoting legislative history of section 1988).
170. This Article does not address whether separate litigation funds are justified in the context of
union-prepaid legal services programs. However, my policy analysis may also apply to unions.
171. Cf. Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 544 n.6 (1983) (burden of main-
taining separate organizations for lobbying and for tax-exempt nonlobbying activities is not great).
172. According to my survey, almost 45% of all ACLU affiliates (22 of 50) now maintain sepa-
rate litigation funds into which they deposit all court-awarded fees. Among other public interest
groups, nearly 40% maintain separate litigation funds. However, a group's assertion that it maintains
a separate fund does not guarantee market rate fees because courts, staff attorneys, and defendants can
challenge the adequacy of a fund on various grounds, such as use of the fund for nonlitigation pur-
poses, control of the fund by nonlawyers, or inadequate record keeping.
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groups that spend more on litigation than they receive in fees can easily
dedicate fee awards to litigation without diminishing their level of support
for nonlitigation programs.' Applying the fee awards to further litiga-
tion also superficially promotes the purpose of section 1988, which is "to
ensure 'effective access to the judicial process' for persons with civil rights
grievances."' 4
In addition, litigation funds may lessen the temptation for nonlawyers
to exercise control over fee-award money'7 5 because fee awards will not be
available to finance general activities and operating expenses. 17 6 If an or-
ganization's lay leadership could use fee awards for general expenses, the
lay leaders might pressure the organization's attorneys to generate higher
fees, or to generate them sooner.
On the other hand, requiring public interest organizations to deposit all
fee awards into water-tight litigation funds has some serious drawbacks.
First, requiring separate litigation funds will distort incentives to litigate.
For some public interest groups, conditioning market rate fees on the
maintenance of separate litigation funds will effectively coerce them to ap-
ply all fee awards toward more litigation. But litigation is not always the
best way for public interest groups to further their goals. Most public
interest groups carry on extensive recruiting, fundraising, educational, and
lobbying activities that are important companions to litigation.17 If people
173. For example, if an organization spends $100,000 per year on litigation but receives only
$40,000 per year in attorney fee awards, it should make no difference to the organization whether the
S40,000 in fees goes into the organization's general treasury or into a separate litigation fund. Either
way, the organization will have to spend $60,000 out of its other (nonfee) revenues to finance a
litigation budget of $100,000.
174. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429 (1983) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1558, supra note
132, at 1).
175. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Department of the Navy, 733 F.2d 1578, 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (sepa-
rate litigation fund was under sole control of union's General Counsel), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189
(1985).
176. This argument is probably flawed because it rests on the premise that nonlawyers in public
interest organizations are interested in raising money only for general purposes, not for litigation.
That premise is unsound. One would suppose that a nonlawyer would be interested in raising funds
for all of an organization's programs, not just for those that could be carried out by nonlawyers.
177. See Boggs, The Role of Public Interest Organizations and the Private Bar in Civil Rights
Enforcement in the 1980's, 37 RUTGERS L. REv. 1065, 1089 (1985) (urging civil rights groups to use
"non-litigation models to address civil rights and poverty issues not readily susceptible to direct litiga-
tion attack").
Under section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, tax-exempt public interest groups may jeop-
ardize their tax-deductible status if they engage in extensive lobbying. See I.R.C. §§ 170(a)(1),
(c)(2)(D) (West 1987) (providing that charitable donation is tax deductible only if recipient organiza-
tion "is not disqualified for tax exemption under section 501(c)(3) by reason of attempting to influ-
ence legislation"). However, public interest groups can lobby on a limited basis without jeopardizing
their tax-deductible status if they make an election under section 501(h) and abide by its require-
ments. Moreover, many organizations that engage in public interest litigation are tax exempt under
section 501(c)(4), which does not restrict lobbying efforts, rather than sections 501(c)(3) or 501(h),
which restrict lobbying. Telephone interview with Ronald Williams, Assistant Branch Chief, Internal
Revenue Service Employee Plans and Exempt Organizations Support Services Branch (Jan. 31, 1989)
(reporting that most recent available data-from April 1986-show that 27 of 167 tax-exempt organi-
zations engaging in public interest litigation were exempt under section 501(c)(4) rather than section
501(c)(3)). Under NTEU, however, attorney fees could not be used to finance lobbying efforts.
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are not educated about their rights, they cannot litigate to enforce them; if
governments do not respect people's rights, litigation may be inadequate;
and if public interest groups lack adequate physical resources (such as
space or equipment), litigation may be ineffective. A fee award might
therefore be best used for nonlitigation purposes, such as hiring fun-
draisers, lobbying for new laws, publicizing victories, purchasing com-
puters, or organizing community groups. Fee awards should not be like
food stamps, which carry paternalistic restrictions on what can and cannot
be purchased, and groups should not suffer the penalty of lower fee
awards for spending fees on things they consider more important than
litigation. 178 Section 1988 already gives public interest organizations a
strong incentive to pursue litigation because groups can win attorney fees
under section 1988 only for litigating-not for lobbying, mediating, or-
ganizing, or educating. Rewarding only those groups that apply all fee
awards to litigation may make the incentive to litigate stronger than Con-
gress intended.
Conversely, denying market rate fee awards to groups that do not
maintain separate litigation funds17 would make the incentive to litigate
too weak, undercutting the deterrence policy of section 1988. One function
of a statutory fee award is to deter defendants from violating constitu-
tional rights in the future by letting them know that defending civil rights
violations is expensive.1 80 By making the defense of civil rights violations
less expensive, reducing fee awards to cost plus overhead could lower the
degree of deterrence. 81
Requiring separate litigation funds will also complicate the fee-award
process. Justice Powell cautioned that fee awards should not generate "a
second major litigation," '182 but enforcing the separate litigation fund re-
quirement may consume substantial judicial time. If a group has a litiga-
tion fund, a court will have to examine the group's books, decide which
178. On the other hand, most groups have litigation budgets that far exceed the amount they
receive in fees. My empirical data shows that in 75% to 80% of all public interest groups (including
most ACLU affiliates), fee awards have accounted for less than one-fourth of their total income over
the last five years. For these groups, a separate litigation fund is merely a bookkeeping entry showing
that attorney fee awards all go toward further litigation.
179. See supra note 172 (reporting survey data indicating that 55% of ACLU affiliates and 60%
of other public interest groups do not currently maintain separate litigation funds). These results may
overstate the problem because some of the survey respondents may dedicate all of their resources to
litigation and thus have no need for a separate litigation fund. But most of the survey respondents
apparently engage in many activities other than litigation, and these groups would be denied market
rate fees if courts required separate litigation funds.
180. See Davis v. Bolger, 512 F. Supp. 61, 63-64 (D.D.C. 1981).
181. One could argue that separate litigation funds strengthen the deterrence policy of section
1988 by letting all potential defendants know that a public interest group is maintaining a war chest
that can be used only for litigation. This argument is weak, however, because the mere ability to
finance future litigation is an inadequate deterrent unless the financial resources are backed up by
nonlitigation activities such as educating people about their rights and training more lawyers to han-
dle civil rights cases.
182. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437 (1983).
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expenses relate to "litigation," and monitor future expenditures to ensure
that the fees are spent exclusively on litigation.18 If a group does not have
a separate litigation fund, the court will have to determine the overhead
attributable to each victory. 1"
Finally, public interest organizations that devote major efforts to raising
funds for litigation may have a strong incentive to interfere with litigation
in order to increase fee awards, even if fee awards must be deposited into
a separate litigation fund. It is thus difficult to believe that a separate
litigation fund will significantly guard against the abuses that the fee-
sharing rule is designed to prevent. 85
3. Opinions Going Beyond NTEU
Despite the policy problems with separate litigation funds, several cases
have taken an even more restrictive position than NTEU, holding that
market rate fees are inappropriate even if a nonprofit organization does
183. The requirement of separate litigation funds may cause litigants to waste time arguing
whether a litigation fund is adequate, verifying that fees are deposited in the litigation fund, and
ensuring that fees are put back into the litigative programs that made their recovery possible in the
first place. Much of this work will be done by the defendant because the defendant wants to reduce
the amount of the fee award. Nevertheless, the court may have to decide various issues, rule on
discovery motions, and read briefs on the litigation fund issue. For example, the court may have to
decide whether a defendant may look into the books and records of a public interest organization.
184. In NTEU itself, the court remanded for a proper calculation of "the cost to the union of
supplying the attorneys' services." 656 F.2d at 849 n.11. To calculate overhead precisely, a court must
determine how much the nonprofit group paid for secretarial services, rent, office equipment, depreci-
ation, and other typical components of overhead in connection with the particular case at hand. This
is an awesome task. Cf J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-13, at 326 (3d
ed. 1988) (predicting "bloody battles" over phrase "reasonable overhead" in U.C.C. § 2-708(2) be-
cause one can expect "no unanimity among accountants about what is overhead and what is not or
about how the overhead is to be allocated to the seller's various contracts"). Fortunately, courts have
developed a convenient shortcut for calculating overhead; they simply double the amount allocable to
the attorney's salary. See, e.g., Sabey v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 36, 36 (1984) (awarding fees at
salaried hourly rate of union attorney, plus "an equal amount as overhead"); Powell v. Department of
the Treasury, 8 M.S.P.B. 21, 29-30 (1981) (explaining rationale for formula). But either party has
the right to challenge this formula and to ask courts to calculate actual overhead if it presents "evi-
dence . that such an allowance of 100 percent of attorney compensation for professional overhead
is substantially excessive or insufficient in the particular case." Powell, 8 M.S.P.B. at 30 (allowing
"such variations for individual cases as the evidence may justify"). One court was recently presented
with just such a challenge. See Johnson v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 321 (1989) (rejecting plaintiffs'
challenges to applications of Powell formula in case where union maintained separate litigation fund).
The plaintiffs in Johnson unsuccessfully argued: (1) that a staff attorney's gross salary for purposes of
the Powell cost-plus-overhead formula should include such fringe benefits as "health, optical, and life
insurance; contributions to an employees' pension plan; workers' compensation insurance; FICA; and
state unemployment taxes"; and (2) that the hourly rate of a staff attorney should be calculated based
on the hours actually worked (excluding vacation and sick days, for example) rather than on the total
number of working hours available in the year. Id. at 326.
185. See American Association of Law Schools Clinical Section, Report of the Committee on Clin-
ics and Attorney Fees 32 n.66 (1987) (on file with author) (in considering relationship between law
school and its clinical programs, there is no reason to believe that law school will have "less interest in
collecting fees that can be used for future litigation than in collecting fees that can be used for non-
litigation advocacy"). However, this danger will not rise to the level of a compelling state interest
unless there is a showing of actual harm in a particular case. See infra text accompanying notes
324-45.
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channel fees into a separate litigation fund. In Wells v. Schweiker,'86 for
example, a labor union sought fees at market rates and stressed that the
fees would be deposited into "a special Legal Representation Fund" used
"only for purposes directly related to the legal representation of peti-
tioner's members."187 The Merit Systems Protection Board considered this
to be irrelevant: "[Wihether or not petitioner elects to expend its attorney
fee awards solely for litigation-related purposes, the fact remains that the
application of the market-value formula to the fee award here would al-
low petitioner to profit from the underlying activities of its attorneys in
this matter." 88 The "profit" would be "commensurate with the extent to
which such an award would relieve petitioner of the burden of financing
its litigation activities through its general revenue funds."' 89 Accordingly,
the Board based fees on cost plus overhead, not market rates. 9 The
Claims Court reached a similar conclusion in Sabey v. United States. 9'
Fortunately for public interest groups, Wells and Sabey were not in-
tended to govern awards in public interest cases. In Sabey, for example,
the court emphasized that the fee-award policy of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act'92 was unlike the policy of section 1988 because "[r]ather than
merely ensuring that employees recover back wages . . . without incur-
ring out-of-pocket expenses, civil rights statutes are intended to actively
encourage suits to vindicate fundamental rights."' 93 But this dictum about
section 1988 is not very comforting. Defendants in civil rights cases will
inevitably argue that a litigation fund not fully funded by fee awards al-
lows an indirect benefit to nonlawyers and does not qualify for market
rate awards.
If applied to public interest organizations, cases like Wells and Sabey
would cause serious harm. Allowing market rate fees only to those groups
wealthy enough to finance all litigation out of a separate litigation fund
186. 12 M.S.P.B. 329 (1982). In Wells, the Merit Systems Protection Board considered the fee-
award provision of the Back Pay Act, 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1)(A)(ii) (1982).
187. 12 M.S.P.B. at 332.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. In Goodrich v. Department of the Navy, 733 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
469 U.S. 1189 (1985), the court followed Wells. The union had established a separate litigation fund,
under the sole control of the union's General Counsel, that could be used "solely for legal work." Id.
at 1579. Nevertheless, the court limited the fee award to the union's expenses in providing the ser-
vices. Id. at 1580. But the court left open the question "whether a different result might be appropri-
ate if a legal representation fund fully supported the union's legal services program." Id. at 1581. The
D.C. Bar rejected Goodrich. See D.C. Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 176 (Oct. 21, 1986),
reprinted in DISmICr OF COLUMBIA BAR LEGAL ETHiCs COMMrTTEE OPINIONs 291, 292 (agree-
ing with Jordan that market rate fee awards to nonprofit groups maintaining funds devoted exclu-
sively to legal activities are not "shared" with group, and therefore do not violate rule against fee
sharing).
191. 6 Cl. Ct. 36, 36 (1984) (where union represented plaintiffs in Fair Labor Standards Act case
at no cost as benefit of membership, fee award under Act based on "the hourly salary of plaintiffs'
counsel, and an equal amount to cover overhead, is reasonable and appropriate").
192. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1982).
193. 6 Cl. Ct. at 37 (citing Goodrich, 733 F.2d at 1580).
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would be a cruel irony. Any group whose litigation fund was too small to
finance its entire litigation program would be unable to increase the size
of the fund through fee awards to its staff attorneys. This rule would
especially hurt new groups trying to expand their litigation programs by
plowing fee awards back into further litigation. Most new groups would
probably not have sufficient litigation funds to cover their entire litigation
programs, so under the rationale of Wells and Sabey they would at best be
able to break even on litigation even if they won every case.19 4 Since every
public interest group loses some cases, the supply of new funds for public
interest litigation would inevitably diminish in the long run.1 95
Quite properly, therefore, one court has sharply questioned the ration-
ale of Wells and has indicated that full market rate fee awards are appro-
priate even if nonprofit groups do not channel fees into separate litigation
funds. In Curran v. Department of the Treasury,"' a case discussing thefee-award provision of the Back Pay Act, 9" the court observed:
The Board's assumption that an above-cost fee award will always
provide an indirect economic benefit to the non-legal activities of a
lay organization is incorrect . . . . Although an organization may
choose to divert its original contribution of general revenues for liti-
gation to support an expansion of its lay activity, it may choose to
instead maintain its original contribution and simply add this
amount to any fees awarded to the litigation fund as a means of
financing greater legal activity.'95
194. In Devine v. National Treasury Employees Union, 805 F.2d 384 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 108 S. Ct. 67 (1987), a case denying market rate fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986), the court recognized that "[d]ifferent concerns exist
when awarding attorney fees in civil rights cases." 805 F.2d at 388 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S.
886 (1984)); see also Goodrich, 733 F.2d at 1580-81 (fee-award provision in Back Pay Act is unlike
section 1988, because section 1988 fee awards are intended to encourage suits to vindicate civil rights,
but there is "no comparable public policy to encourage the bringing of suit by federal employees
challenging adverse personnel actions against them"); Powell v. Department of the Treasury, 8
M.S.P.B. 21, 27 n.5 (1981) (rule that fees cannot exceed union's costs "does not encompass" fee
awards made under related statute that follows Title VII).
195. Public interest groups could try to make up for the decrease in fee awards by seeking in-
creased charitable donations from the public, but the outlook for raising more funds in this way is not
bright. Although donations to public interest groups by individuals increased dramatically during the
early years of the Reagan administration, individual contributions were actually lower in 1983 than in
1975. See N. ARON, supra note 4, at 54. More recent data are no more optimistic. See Cox, New
Figures Show Growth In Donations Has Slackened, Wall St. J., June 13, 1988, § 2, at 19, col. 5
(reporting results of new study of individual donations). Thus, fee awards are likely to remain an
important source of funds for both litigation and nonlitigation activities.
196. 805 F.2d 1406 (9th Cir. 1986). The Curran approach was recently rejected by the Claims
Court in Johnson v. United States, 16 Cl. Ct. 321 (1989).
197. 5 U.S.C. §§ 5596(b)(1)(A)(ii), 7701(g)(1) (1982).
198. 805 F.2d at 1409 n.2 (emphasis in original, citing Wells and Goodrich). In Curran, the
court awarded full market rate fees to a union that maintained "a special fund . . . to support the
litigation of individual and collective federal employee rights before administrative and judicial tribu-
nals." Id. at 1407. The court agreed that a fund of this kind "satisfies the ethical concerns expressed
in NTEU and removes any barrier to the payment of market rates." Id. at 1408 (citations omitted). In
reaching this decision, however, the Curran court termed the requirement of separate litigation funds
"unprecedented in the arena of ethical standards," id. at 1408 n.1, and noted that the government had
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If requiring separate litigation funds is often unwise and unjustified,
and if the existing rules of legal ethics do not otherwise permit lawyers to
share legal fees with public interest groups, perhaps the bar should create
an express exception to the rules that allows lawyers to share legal fees
with public interest organizations. I consider that possibility next.
III. SHOULD THE BAR CREATE AN EXCEPTION?
Rules of professional conduct should be made and revised by the states,
not by the federal courts. When the courts strike down existing rules, they
leave a vacuum in the existing rules, they cloud remedial rulemaking with
dicta, and they tarnish the image of the bar. Unfortunately, the states
have often been painfully slow to recognize emerging constitutional trends
and to revise their codes of legal ethics to acknowledge these trends. The
states fought inch by inch against the rights of public interest organiza-
tions and labor unions to solicit cases, employ counsel, and refer cases to
attorneys, even though the Supreme Court ruled against the states in case
after case on these issues. 9 ' The states fought an equally determined bat-
tle against the rights of lawyers to advertise through printed media, even
though the Supreme Court struck down every state rule it considered that
restricted truthful legal advertising in print.2 00
If the anecdotal data and the naked language of the fee-sharing rule are
any guide, the states appear equally determined to maintain a strong
"wall of separation" between lawyers and nonlawyers with regard to legal
cited "no ethical authority in support of its position," id. at 1409. See also D.C. Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Formal Op. 176 (Oct. 21, 1986), reprinted in DiSTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR LEGAL ETHICS
COMMITTEE OPINIONS 291, 292 n.4 (reserving possibility that market rate fee award might be ethical
even "if it were not deposited in a separate legal assistance fund").
199. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 434-35 (1978) (absent proof of undue influence, overreach-
ing, misrepresentation, or invasion of privacy, state may not discipline lawyer for sending unsolicited
letter on behalf of ACLU offering free legal representation to potential plaintiff); United Transp.
Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 585 (1971) (state cannot constitutionally enjoin labor union's prac-
tice of recommending particular lawyers to its injured members, limiting fees that could be charged by
those lawyers, transporting members to lawyers' offices, and requiring lawyers to reimburse union for
transportation expenses); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22
(1967) (labor union has First Amendment right to hire attorney on salary basis to serve members);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 8 (1964) (First
Amendment protects right of union to recommend specific lawyers to its injured members); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 417 (1963) (unconstitutional for state to make it unlawful for organization to
recommend particular attorneys to conduct litigation in which organization has no pecuniary right or
liability).
200. See Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988) (striking down state ethical
rule prohibiting truthful targeted mail solicitation to people known to need legal services); Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985) (striking down state rule prohibiting lawyers
from placing truthful newspaper advertisements soliciting plaintiffs and offering legal advice regard-
ing particular legal problems); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (striking down complete ban on
truthful written advertisements using language not approved by state courts); Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350 (1977) (striking down state rule prohibiting truthful newspaper advertising of prices by
lawyers soliciting employment for routine legal services). The only case in which the Supreme Court
upheld a state rule in the area of advertising and solicitation is Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447 (1978) (state may prohibit lawyers from soliciting clients in person, for pecuniary gain,
under circumstance likely to pose dangers of improper conduct).
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fees. 20 1 But the states should not cling blindly to tradition on the matter of
fee sharing. Rather, the states should carefully reexamine the fee-sharing
rule to determine whether an exception is wise, and what that exception
should provide. In undertaking this reexamination, the bar should keep in
mind the risk that if the bar does not voluntarily create an exception that
allows fee sharing with public interest groups, the courts may force them
to do so. 202 In deciding whether to allow lawyers to share legal fees with
public interest groups, the bar should compare the state interests in en-
forcing the present blanket prohibition against fee sharing to the public
interests in permitting the unfettered use of fee awards by public interest
groups.
A. The State's Interests: The Seven Deadly Sins
The prohibition against fee sharing is intended to guard against seven
"deadly sins": (1) stirring up litigation; (2) improper methods of solicita-
tion; (3) the unauthorized practice of law; (4) excessive fees; (5) referrals
to incompetent lawyers; (6) unethical litigation practices; and (7) injurious
lay interference with the attorney-client relationship.20 3 These justifica-
tions for the fee-sharing prohibition grew up almost entirely in the com-
mercial sphere, and most of them are inapplicable or highly speculative in
the context of public interest litigation. Moreover, every one of the state's
interests is already protected by other rules and statutes.
1. Eliminating Incentives for Nonlawyers to Stir Up Litigation
In the state's view, nonlawyers who share legal fees have an incentive to
solicit plaintiffs for cases, and thus stir up litigation that might otherwise
remain dormant. By preventing this, states can relieve pressure on court
dockets and preserve social harmony.2'" In the context of nonprofit public
interest litigation, however, the state's interest in preventing nonlawyers
201. In addition to the fee-sharing prohibition per se, see MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule
5.4(b) (providing that lawyer "shall not form a partnership with a nonlawyer if any of the activities of
the partnership consist of the practice of law"); MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 3-103(A) (substan-
tially identical).
202. Professor Hazard has suggested that the rigid rule against fee sharing may be unconstitu-
tional even as applied to commercial lawyers in profit-making law firms as an "irrational regulation
of business." See HAZARD & HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 65, at 472. A constitu-
tional analysis of the fee-sharing rule in the for-profit context is beyond the scope of this Article, but
the policy analysis of allowing fee sharing with public interest organizations, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 203-59, suggests that the states should allow some fee sharing with nonlawyers in the
commercial arena. This was certainly the view of the Kutak Commission. See supra note 64 (quoting
Kutak Commission proposal).
203. This list draws on the numerous cases and ethical opinions cited earlier in this Article. See
supra text accompanying notes 25-82. I should note that lawyers are fully capable of committing all
of these sins themselves, but since lawyers are trained in legal ethics and are officers of the court, the
rule against fee sharing with nonlawyers is focused primarily on the potential wickedness of
nonlawyers.
204. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 375-76 (1977) (discussing "societal repose").
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from fomenting litigation or soliciting plaintiffs carries no weight. As the
Court noted in NAACP v. Button, 05 a public interest law suit is a form
of political expression to be encouraged, not an evil to be prevented. 206
Accordingly, the Court held that the NAACP had a First Amendment
right to solicit plaintiffs to file school desegregation suits.2 0 7 Since Button,
the Court has made clear that both lawyers and nonlawyers have a consti-
tutional right to solicit cases on behalf of nonprofit public interest organi-
zations, provided that the solicitors do not stand to reap any personal fi-
nancial benefit from the solicitation. 08
2. Preventing Improper Methods of Solicitation by Nonlawyers
The state does retain a strong interest in prohibiting abusive methods of
solicitation, such as false or misleading statements, undue influence, or
invasion of privacy.20 9 From the state's perspective, even public interest
groups might be tempted to use these improper methods of solicitation if
cases could result in fee awards that would benefit the organizations. This
view is logical. Public interest groups already have a strong ideological
interest in soliciting plaintiffs by whatever means necessary. The addi-
tional incentives of a share of the legal fees will undeniably increase this
incentive. However, the state already prohibits false or misleading com-
munications about legal services, 1 ' and the Supreme Court has indicated
that states can directly prohibit public interest groups from using im-
proper methods of solicitation.211 These existing protections appear to be
effective, for there is no evidence that existing fee-sharing agreements with
public interest organizations are causing the organizations to engage in
improper methods of solicitation.212 Thus, the state's interest in using the
205. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
206. See id. at 429-30, 440. The dissent agreed, stating: "We have passed the point where litiga-
tion is regarded as an evil that must be avoided if some accommodation short of a lawsuit can possibly
be worked out." Id. at 453 (Harlan, J., dissenting); see also In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 436-37
(1978) (fear of "'stirring up' of frivolous or vexatious litigation" does not justify violation of First
Amendment rights); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 376 n.32 (1977) ("It would be difficult to
understand [Button and the other group legal services cases] if a lawsuit were somehow viewed as an
evil in itself.").
207. Button, 371 U.S. at 429-30.
208. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 422-32 (1978); United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401
U.S. 576, 585 (1971); United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-25 (1967);
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex tel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1964).
209. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 432 (1978) (not disputing "importance" of state's interests
in preventing solicitation that employs undue influence, overreaching, misrepresentation, and invasion
of privacy).
210. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 5, Rule 7.1(a).
211. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 438 (1978) (state may proscribe solicitation by lawyers that
is "misleading, overbearing, or involves other features of deception or improper influence" (footnote
omitted)).
212. The lack of evidence may be more significant than usual because the enemies of public
interest organizations would probably be quick to publicize any alleged improprieties. On the other
hand, the lack of evidence may indicate the extreme difficulty of policing personal solicitation. Cf.
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466 (1978) ("[I]n-person solicitation is not visible or
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fee-sharing rule to curb improper solicitation seems to be speculative and
weak. 213
3. Preventing Unauthorized Practice of Law
In theory, a nonlawyer sharing in legal fees has an incentive to engage
in the unauthorized practice of law.21' For example, a nonlawyer might
handle legal matters personally rather than turning away business when a
lawyer is not available, or might give legal advice to a plaintiff to influ-
ence the plaintiff's decisions about the case in a way that would maximize
legal fees for the nonlawyer, possibly at the expense of the plaintiff's best
interests. These concerns have some logical force. A public interest group
in immediate need of funds might be tempted to send lay representatives
to persuade a plaintiff to settle (so that the plaintiff could petition for
fees),215 and a public interest group intent on maximizing fees over the
long run might advise a plaintiff to reject a settlement offer and go to
trial, thus increasing the total fee award if the plaintiff prevails.
It is very difficult to learn whether any abuses of this type are actually
happening. If they are, however, the states already combat them by en-
forcing existing statutes prohibiting the unauthorized practice of law,21 '
and by enforcing ethical rules that make lawyers responsible for the con-
duct of nonlawyer associates217 and prohibit lawyers from assisting
nonlawyers in the unauthorized practice of law.218 A broad prophylactic
response to a speculative danger, in the form of a blanket ban against fee
sharing with all nonlawyers and nonlawyer groups, seems unwarranted.
4. Preventing Excessive Fees
In the commercial arena, the states have historically argued that fee
sharing with nonlawyers leads to excessive legal fees because a client is
paying both a nonlawyer and a lawyer, rather than just a lawyer.21 9 In
otherwise open to public scrutiny. Often there is no witness other than the lawyer and the layperson
whom he has solicited, rendering it difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually
took place.").
213. In Button, the state presented evidence suggesting that some school segregation plaintiffs had
been improperly lured into litigation by the NAACP. See 371 U.S. at 422 n.6. The Court, however,
faulted the plaintiffs for their ignorance and found the NAACP to be blameless. Id.
214. The Model Code provides that "[s]ince a lawyer should not aid or encourage a layman to
practice law, [a layman] should not practice law in association with a layman or otherwise share legal
fees with a layman." MODEL CODE, supra note 5, EC 3-8.
215. It is important to keep in mind that a plaintiff is entitled to fees even if she prevails through
settlement rather than by winning at trial. See Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 (1980) ("The fact
that respondent prevailed through a settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her
claim to fees.").
216. See Rhode, supra note 37.
217. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 5.3(c) (setting forth circumstances in which lawyers
are responsible for violations of rules by nonlawyers).
218. See id. Rule 5.5(b) (prohibiting lawyers from assisting nonlawyers in "activity that consti-
tutes the unauthorized practice of law").
219. See, e.g., Alpers v. Hunt, 86 Cal. 78, 88, 24 P. 846, 849 (1890); Emmons, Williams, Mires
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addition, overbearing lay solicitation might discourage comparison shop-
ping for lawyers, thus preventing people from searching for the lowest
fee.22 Even in the for-profit setting, such theories are questionable, espe-
cially now that advertising by lawyers permits potential clients to compare
fees with relative ease. In public interest litigation, these theories are com-
pletely inapplicable because fees are paid by the losing party, not by the
client, and are either negotiated at arms length or awarded after judicial
review. 221 The amount of the fee award will be the same whether it is
paid to the lawyer alone or to the lawyer and a nonlawyer together. 222
In any event, the states already guard against excessive fees in other
ways. The disciplinary rules prohibit lawyers from charging excessive
fees, 223 and the fee-award statutes themselves expressly mandate that fee
awards be "reasonable. 22 4 Given the meticulous case-by-case review of
statutory fee awards, 2 5 this protection seems more than adequate and the
fee-sharing rule seems entirely unnecessary.
5. Preventing Referrals to Incompetent Lawyers
Allowing nonlawyers to share fees could encourage nonlawyers to refer
cases to those lawyers willing to share the highest percentage of their fees
& Leech v. State Bar, 6 Cal. App. 3d 565, 574-75, 86 Cal. Rptr. 367, 373 (1970); New York State
Bar Ass'n Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 572 (June 5, 1985), reprinted in [1986-2
Transfer Binder] Nat'l Rep. on Legal Ethics & Prof. Resp. (UPA) NY:OPINIONS:31.
220. This argument depends on the questionable assumption that fee sharing leads nonlawyers to
apply undue influence to cajole clients into signing retainers. See supra text accompanying notes
209-13.
221. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 429-30 (1978) (noting "differences between counsel fees
awarded by a court and traditional fee-paying arrangements"). If the parties are unable to negotiate
the amount of a fee award, the amount is set by a court based on the adversarial submissions of the
parties. See, e.g., Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness v. Community Television, 813 F.2d 217,
221 (9th Cir. 1987); NAACP v. City of Evergreen, 812 F.2d 1332, 1334 (11th Cir. 1987).
222. The state does have an interest in preventing organizations from encouraging their lawyers
to run up fees by spending unnecessary time on a case, but the state can enforce this interest by
prohibiting unnecessary litigation tactics at the outset, by refusing to pay excessive fees in settlement,
or by persuading the court to deny unreasonable fees, as section 1988 requires the court to do. These
methods of combatting excessive fees are narrower and more precise than the blanket ban on fee
sharing with nonlawyers.
One might even argue that fee sharing with public interest groups results in lower fees rather than
higher ones. Once a lawyer has agreed to turn over all fees to the organization, the lawyer loses all
financial interest in the fee award and only the organization retains an interest. Because of its non-
profit and tax-exempt status, and because nonlawyers are ordinarily willing to work for less money
than lawyers, the organization may be content with a lower fee than the lawyer personally would
accept.
223. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs, supra note 5, Rule 1.5(a) ("A lawyer's fee shall be reasonable.");
MODEL CODE, supra note 5, DR 2-106(A) ("A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge,
or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.").
224. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982) (allowing court to award "reasonable" fee to prevailing
party in civil rights litigation); id. § 2000e-5(k) (allowing court to award "reasonable" fee to prevail-
ing party in employment discrimination litigation).
225. See, e.g., Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435-36 (1983) (requiring courts to deny fees
for work unrelated to successful claims); Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 769-80 (11th Cir. 1988)
(scrutinizing fee award under Equal Access to Justice Act and remanding for new calculation); Law-
rence v. City of Philadelphia, 700 F. Supp. 832, 835-36 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (reviewing fee petition and
denying part of fee request).
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rather than to those best qualified to handle cases.22 If Attorney A will
share a higher percentage of fees than Attorney B, then nonlawyers will
have an incentive to refer cases to Attorney A even if Attorney A is not
competent, or even if Attorney B is more competent.
227
But this fear makes little sense in the statutory award context because
there are no fees to share unless the attorney prevails. Groups therefore
have a strong financial incentive to select the most competent attorneys in
order to maximize fees. In addition, public interest groups have an ideo-
logical incentive to choose attorneys who will win cases and set favorable
precedents. And as a practical matter, most groups require attorneys to
share a fixed amount of the fee; they do not negotiate on a case-by-case
basis to see which attorney will share the highest percentage.228 The con-
cern about referrals to incompetent attorneys is therefore very weak.
In any case, Rule 7.2(c) already prohibits lawyers from paying more
than the "usual charges" to obtain cases from public interest groups,229
and Rule 1.1 requires lawyers to handle matters competently.230
6. Preventing Unethical Practices in Litigation
The bar believes that nonlawyers, who are not bound by professional
standards and are under the jurisdiction neither of the bar nor of the
courts, might resort to unethical practices to win cases in which they have
a contingent share.2 3' For example, a nonlawyer whose income depends
on winning a case might bribe a witness or juror, create false evidence,
destroy evidence, or engage in other unethical practices-or might urge a
226. This argument is independent of the argument that fee-sharing agreements would cause
nonlawyers to use improper methods of solicitation. Bankers, realtors, accountants, and many other
nonlawyers who do not actively solicit cases are frequently asked to recommend lawyers.
227. This undesirable practice has occurred for decades in the personal injury field. See Philadel-
phia Report, supra note 49, at 9 ("A large number of Philadelphia physicians make it a practice of
referring accident cases to lawyers in return for a commission . . . on a percentage basis.").
228. In my empirical survey, only a handful of organizations reported negotiating fee agreements
on a case-by-case basis, and those groups indicated that they were willing to share a higher percentage
of the fee when necessary either to attract more competent lawyers, or to compensate lawyers for
taking on risky cases unlikely to yield any fees. Perhaps some attorneys refuse to work on cases for
public interest organizations that require fee sharing, and in that sense organizations may be referring
cases to less competent attorneys than if they did not require fee sharing. But this is not the evil that
the rule is intended to prevent. By analogy, private law firms might be able to hire more competent
attorneys if they offered higher salaries or more favorable partnership terms, but a refusal to do so
does not violate the rules of legal ethics.
229. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 5, Rule 7.2(c); supra text accompanying notes 90-110 (dis-
cussing rule and its Code counterpart).
230. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representa-
tion to a client.").
231. This fear is also reflected in other rules, such as the common prohibition against paying
contingent fees to expert witnesses. See MODEL RuLES, supra note 5, Rule 3.4(b) (lawyer shall not
"offer an inducement to a witness that is prohibited by law"); id. Rule 3.4(b) comment (noting "com-
mon law rule in most jurisdictions. . . that it is improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee").
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lawyer to do so.232 The state unquestionably has a strong interest in
preventing these abusive practices.
In the context of public interest litigation, however, there is no evidence
of these abusive practices.2"3 Even though most public interest organiza-
tions do currently share in fee awards, 3' public interest organizations and
their lawyers are seldom the target of sanctions for unethical litigation
practices.235 This is especially significant given the novelty of many cases
sponsored by public interest groups and the hostility that many defendants
must feel for those who solicit and sponsor litigation against them. Appar-
ently, because of their high visibility, their desire for charitable donations,
their limited financial resources, their basic integrity, and their dedication
to the rule of law, public interest groups and their lawyers pay especially
careful attention to ethical obligations. The interest in using the fee-
sharing rule to prevent unethical litigation practices therefore seems weak.
In any event, the existing protections against unethical litigation prac-
tices are abundant. The rules of legal ethics, 3 ' the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,23 7  inherent judicial power,28  and state substantive laws
against fraud, perjury, and other evils already prohibit the unsavory con-
duct at which the fee-sharing rule is aimed.
7. Protecting the Attorney-Client Relationship
The foremost purpose of the rule against fee sharing is "to protect the
lawyer's professional independence of judgment,"239 which amounts to
protecting the attorney-client relationship from injurious lay interfer-
ence.2 0 The state's argument is that fee-sharing agreements give public
232. For historical examples of litigation fraud perpetrated by nonlawyers who shared in legal
fees, see Philadelphia Report, supra note 49, at 40-46 (discussing false medical testimony and repair
bills).
233. This is not to say that public interest lawyers are never sanctioned. There are some recent
examples of improper litigation conduct by lawyers for public interest groups. See, e.g., Bell v.
Lynaugh, 858 F.2d 978, 981-83 (5th Cir. 1988) (rebuking law school's Capital Punishment Clinic
for abusing writ of habeas corpus by repeatedly filing last minute appeals). But the fact that such
sanctions are rare suggests that fee-sharing arrangements do not lead to improprieties often enough to
warrant a prophylactic rule prohibiting all fee sharing with public interest organizations.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 17-20 (discussing empirical data).
235. See generally AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF LITIGATION, SANCTIONS: RULE
11 AND OTHER PowERs (2d ed. 1988) (collecting numerous cases).
236. See, e.g., MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 3.1 (prohibiting frivolous claims and defenses);
id. Rule 3.2 (prohibiting unjustified delay); id. Rule 3.3(a) (prohibiting false evidence); id. Rule 3.4
(requiring fairness to opposing parties and counsel).
237. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11, 26(g), 37 (prohibiting unreasonable pleadings, motions, and
discovery tactics).
238. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-32 (1962) (discussing inherent judicial power
to sanction litigation abuse).
239. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 5.4 comment. The title of the rule is "Professional Inde-
pendence of a Lawyer." See also Button, 371 U.S. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (challenged law
reflects state's deep desire "to prevent any interference with the uniquely personal relationship be-
tween lawyer and client").
240. The bedrock of the attorney-client relationship is loyalty-"the lawyer's virtually total loy-
alty to the client and the client's interests." C. WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 4.1, at 146
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interest groups an incentive to interfere with the independent judgment of
the lawyers. Specifically, fee-sharing agreements give organizations an in-
centive to maximize attorney fees, even if this harms client interests. For
example, an organization might urge a lawyer to oppose a favorable set-
tlement if a trial would be likely to result in a higher fee award.241 Con-
versely, an organization might encourage the lawyer to recommend that a
client accept an inadequate settlement if the terms include generous attor-
ney fees.242 An organization might also discourage an attorney from
spending adequate time on cases unlikely to yield fee awards.2"'
For staff attorneys, the dangers of lay interference are inherent. As Jus-
tice Harlan explained in his dissenting opinion in Button: "When an at-
torney is employed by an association or corporation to represent individ-
ual litigants ... the lawyer necessarily finds himself with a divided
allegiance-to his employer and to his client-which may prevent full
compliance with his basic professional obligations."2"4 The question is
whether this danger of divided allegiance is serious enough to warrant a
total prohibition on fee sharing between lawyers and public interest
organizations.
In the abstract, the degree of danger depends on two factors. First, how
great is the organization's incentive to interfere with the attorney-client
relationship? Second, how much leverage does the organization have over
its attorneys? The mix of incentive and leverage varies depending on
whether the attorney handling a case is a cooperating attorney or a staff
attorney.
In the case of cooperating attorneys, fee-sharing agreements do not pre-
sent a serious danger to the attorney-client relationship. An organization's
(1986). To fulfill the duty of loyalty, attorneys must exercise professional judgment solely in the best
interests of their clients, avoiding conflicts not only with other current clients, but also with former
clients, third parties, and the lawyers' own personal and financial interests. See MODEL RULES, supra
note 5, Rule 1.7 & comment ("Loyalty is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a
client.").
241. Occasionally, fees are available for monitoring a consent decree, or for other post-settlement
work. But in most cases a settlement ends all billing on a case.
242. A court can disapprove a negotiated fee agreement if it has judicial power to review the
agreement, but the court has such review power only in class actions and other special cases. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 23(e) ("A class action shall not be dismissed or compromised without the approval of the
court. . . ."); R. MARCUS & E. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION 469 (1985) ("[U]nlike almost all
other settlements, class action settlements are subject to substantive review by the court."). Courts
have no power to review settlements in cases brought by individuals, even if a settlement may substan-
tially affect the public interest. See FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a) (giving plaintiffs automatic right to dismiss
any action-except class action, action where receiver has been appointed, or action where dismissal is
governed by federal statute-simply by filing stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties to action).
243. Cf. Florida Bar v. Consolidated Business and Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So. 2d 797, 798-99
(Fla. 1980) (finding for-profit corporation violated ethical rules by limiting time salaried lawyers
could spend on flat-fee cases).
244. 371 U.S. at 460 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). Justice Harlan saw the potential
for serious conflicts between individual clients and the NAACP. For example, the NAACP prohibited
its branches from sponsoring "equal facility cases," and insisted on pressing for a full and immediate
end to segregation in every case, but an individual litigant might have preferred to negotiate with the
school board rather than see the schools closed for years due to litigation. See id. at 448-50, 462.
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incentive to exercise control is reduced to the extent that a cooperating
attorney will keep part of the fee award. If an organization will share
only half of a fee award, it has only half the financial incentive to inter-
fere with the attorney's handling of the case. Moreover, a cooperating at-
torney is not on the organization's payroll, and thus has no fear of losing
a job for failing to follow the organization's wishes. The cooperating at-
torney also has her own offices, clients, and support staff independent of
the organization. Moreover, the short supply of cooperating attorneys2 45
gives them the upper hand in any disagreements with groups, especially in
controversial or high-risk cases. Thus, an organization's leverage over a
cooperating attorney is relatively small.
In the case of staff attorneys, by comparison, fee-sharing agreements
present a more serious danger of organizational control. Most staff attor-
neys depend on their employers for all of their income, their clients, their
office space, and their support services. They may thus be vulnerable to
an organization's efforts to control litigation. This distinguishes contempo-
rary public interest litigation from the litigation in Button, In re
Primus,246 United Transportation Union v. State Bar,24 7 United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association,248 and Brotherhood of Rail-
road Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar,249 none of which
involved full time staff attorneys. 50 Moreover, because a staff attorney is
part of the organization, enriching the organization through fee awards
indirectly enriches the staff attorney as well.251
The state's argument, however, is entirely hypothetical. As my survey
indicates, virtually every public interest organization that employs staff
attorneys already demands that its staff attorneys turn over all court-
awarded fees. Yet while there is some recent evidence that fee-sharing
agreements have led to harmful lay control over litigation in the private
245. See N. ARON, supra note 4, at 80-82 (between 1975 and 1985, firms began to cut back their
pro bono work). Ms. Aron identifies four possible reasons for this cutback: (1) higher operating costs
and greater competition for private firms have caused pressure to increase billable hours; (2) firms
often reject public interest cases that might offend paying clients; (3) firms prefer pro bono matters
that can be disposed of quickly, so they avoid public interest cases, which often involve extensive fact-
finding and litigation; and (4) public interest cases often require specialized knowledge and skills that
lawyers in private firms do not possess. Id. at 81.
Because of the difficulty of finding cooperating attorneys who were willing to work without any
possibility of obtaining fees, the ACLU began in 1977 to allow state affiliates to share statutory fee
awards with cooperating attorneys. See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 430 n.24 (1978). As a member of
the Legal Steering Committee for the AOLU affiliate in St. Louis, the author also knows from per-
sonal experience that the ACLU is frequently unable to sponsor meritorious cases because cooperating
attorneys cannot be located to handle them.
246. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
247. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
248. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
249. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
250. See infra text accompanying notes 270-316.
251. For example, a staff attorney's working conditions, job security, and future salary level de-
pend heavily on the employing organization's financial condition.
1112 [Vol. 98: 1069
19891 Fee Sharing With Nonlawyers 1113
sector,2 52 there is little evidence that fee-sharing agreements lead to simi-
lar abuses in the public interest context.25 3 Absent reports either of disci-
plinary actions against staff attorneys or of state efforts to penalize public
interest organizations for attempting to control litigation, it seems unrea-
sonable to suppose a danger of harm to the attorney-client relationship
great enough to warrant a total prohibition on fee sharing between law-
yers and public interest groups.
Even if organizations would like to control their staff attorneys, the
rules of legal ethics already provide multiple protections against lay inter-
ference with an attorney's independent judgment. For example, Rule
1.2(a) requires a lawyer to "abide by a client's decisions concerning the
objectives of representation," and more specifically to "abide by a client's
decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter."' ' This rule
prohibits a lawyer from allowing an organization to control decisions
about settlement. In addition, Rule 1.7 prohibits a lawyer from represent-
ing a client if the representation "may be materially limited by the law-
yer's responsibilities . . . to a third person, 2 5  such as the organization.
Other rules address the situation of staff lawyers even more directly.
Rule 1.8(0, for example, prohibits lawyers from accepting compensation
from anyone other than a client unless the third party does not interfere
with "the lawyer's independence of professional judgment or with the cli-
ent-lawyer relationship. 2 56 Rule 5.4(c) reiterates the protections of Rule
1.8(f) by providing that a lawyer "shall not permit a person who recom-
252. In Florida Bar v. Consolidated Business and Legal Forms, Inc., 386 So. 2d 797 (Fla. 1980),
for example, a corporation owned by nonlawyers hired lawyers to provide third parties with legal
services such as uncontested divorces, wills, and personal bankruptcies. Clients paid all fees directly to
the corporation, and the corporation paid the lawyers a salary plus a percentage of gross fees. The
nonlawyers exercised control over the legal services by limiting client conference time per case, pre-
scribing the forms the lawyers could use, and setting fees. See id. at 798-99. The state demonstrated
that these practices had resulted in harm to particular clients. See id. at 800.
253. One well-known scholar has argued that the NAACP has placed its own ideological quest
for racial balance in the schools over the desire of many of its clients for educational improvement. See
Bell, Serving Two Masters. Integration Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litiga-
tion, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 471 (1976) (asking whether philosophical complexities of school desegrega-
tion litigation justify "more diligent oversight of the lawyer-client relationship by the bench and bar").
However, Professor Bell does not discuss fee-sharing arrangements. Moreover, Professor Bell indi-
cates only that some groups of clients within the school desegregation cases had different goals than
the NAACP, not that the NAACP was able to control the litigation over the objections of all clients.
See id. at 482-87.
254. MODEL RuL.Es, supra note 5, Rule 1.2(a).
255. Id. Rule 1.7. This Rule does allow a lawyer to represent a client despite conflicting interests
if the lawyer reasonably believes that the representation will not be adversely affected and the client
consents after being fully informed of the circumstances. Id.
256. Id. Rule 1.8(0. The lawyer's obligation to protect confidential information is set out in Rule
1.6, the essence of which prohibits a lawyer from disclosing client confidences unless the client con-
sents or unless disclosure is necessary to "prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm." Id. Rule 1.6. The
obligation of Rule 1.8(0 to maintain client confidences means that the lawyer cannot reveal client
confidences to the third party who is paying the fees unless the client consents. Even then, the lawyer
has an obligation to ensure that the third party abides by Rule 1.6, whether or not the third party is a
lawyer.
The Yale Law Journal
mends, employs, or pays the lawyer to render legal services for another to
direct or regulate the lawyer's professional judgment in rendering such
legal services."251 7 Rules 1.8(f) and 5.4(c) should be viewed as a recogni-
tion that lawyers can be trusted to resist directions from nonlawyers who
employ them to serve others. Otherwise, these rules would be an empty
aspiration. Staff lawyers for public interest organizations can be trusted to
follow this rule as ably as associates for private law firms, who are like-
wise employed and paid to render legal services for others. 58
In sum, the rule against fee sharing is largely redundant. Even if there
were no rule against fee sharing, the rules of legal ethics would still pro-
hibit lawyers from allowing third parties to compromise independent pro-
fessional judgment, and the state could use these rules to prevent actual or
potential harm. The rules thus already adequately protect the attorney-
client relationship against injurious lay interference. As the Kutak Com-
mission recognized, the state can already satisfy its interests by directly
enforcing existing statutes, ethical rules, and rules of procedure without
imposing a blanket ban on fee sharing between lawyers and
nonlawyers. 259
B. Countervailing Interests: The Value of Public Interest Groups
Even if the dangers of fee sharing were greater, and other protections
for the state's interest were somehow insufficient, there still would be sub-
stantial reasons for allowing lawyers to share legal fees with public inter-
est organizations. In my view, public interest organizations are the unique
and indispensable vehicle through which citizens can systematically spon-
sor and assist litigation advancing broad public interests. Without the ex-
pertise and focusing efforts of public interest groups, individual sponsor-
ship of litigation brought by others would be highly impractical.
Individuals acting alone, without the medium of an association, would be
unable to locate litigants, evaluate cases, find lawyers, or finance the ex-
penses of major litigation, much less to organize a sustained long-term
agenda for coordinating litigation2 60 and working in harmony with like-
minded citizens. 26'
257. Id. Rule 5.4(c).
258. The client pays the bills, but the law firm pays the associate's salary. In a struggle between
the law firm and the client for the associate's time and attention, the law firm seemingly has as least
as much leverage over an associate as a public interest organization has over a staff attorney.
259. See HAZARD & HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING, supra note 65, at 469-72 (arguing that
ABA's adoption of current rule against fee sharing was motivated by "illegitimate rationale, namely
economic protectionism").
260. See generally, M. TUSHNET, THE NAACP's LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED ED-
UCATION 13-20 (1987) (describing formulation of plan for comprehensive legal strategy).
261. In addition to coordinating their own cases to avoid duplication of efforts, many public inter-
est groups coordinate litigation with other public interest groups having similar goals. See O'Connor
& Epstein, supra note 17, at 489, 500 ("liberal" public interest groups have "tended to reinforce each
other's litigation efforts through coordination, either in the form of co-sponsored briefs or amicus
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Moreover, public interest groups serve the administration of justice by
extending legal assistance to individuals who would otherwise be ignorant
of their rights, unable to find a lawyer, or without the financial ability to
undertake litigation on their own behalf.
Finally, public interest groups serve the judicial system and our entire
system of government by focusing litigation on key issues according to a
coherent plan. Using the courts as a complement to the legislative pro-
cess,2 6 2 public interest organizations serve as the political parties of the
judicial system.263 They enable people to band together in support of liti-
gation to further common goals that are beyond the reach of individuals
acting alone and that have not provoked an adequate response in the
majoritarian process of the legislature. 264 Like political parties in the leg-
islative arena, public interest litigation groups focus and distill the broad
range of their members' individual interests into positions that will result
in the greatest good for the greatest number.
In my opinion, the blanket prohibition on fee sharing between lawyers
and public interest groups overestimates the dangers of fee sharing and
undervalues the importance of those groups to society. If the states
reevaluate their longstanding historical reasons for the rule against fee
sharing, they should conclude that those reasons do not support a prohibi-
briefs filed in support of the sponsoring party," and "conservative" public interest groups also "gener-
ally share a similar outlook and thus can coordinate their efforts" (footnotes omitted)). In some areas,
there are informal networks of organizations that "'talk to each other frequently and divide up the
work.'" N. ARON, supra note 4, at 99 (quoting Judith Lichtman of Women's Legal Defense Fund).
262. Public interest groups also devote substantial resources to work at the administrative level,
monitoring and seeking to influence the actions of government agencies that are relatively immune
from the majoritarian political process. See N. ARON, supra note 4, at 95 ("monitoring the activities
of the federal administrative agencies remains a significant part'of the work" of public interest
groups). Bolstered by judicial opinions forcing agencies to allow a greater voice for public interest
groups in administrative decisionmaking, public interest activities at the administrative level have been
so vigorous that they have in many ways transformed the way in which administrative agencies oper-
ate. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667,
1711-16 (1975) (explaining transformation of administrative agencies into forum for broad spectrum
of interest groups).
263. See Comment, The Role of theJudiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of Environ-
mental Quality, 17 UCLA L. REv. 1070, 1098-99 (1970) (arguing that environmental litigation
sponsored by public interest groups has expanded boundaries of standing and thus "enables the indi-
vidual citizen to cast a different kind of vote" (emphasis added)). Public interest lawyers also appear
to see public interest litigation as a highly political endeavor. Public interest lawyers at both ends of
the political spectrum identify strongly with a political party. Lawyers in "liberal" public interest
groups overwhelmingly vote for presidential candidates from the Democratic Party. See Lichter &
Rothman, WVhat Interests the Public and What Interests the Public Interests, PUB. OPINION,
April-May 1983, at 44, 46 table 2 (tabulating survey results indicating that since 1968, no Republi-
can presidential candidate has received more than 4% of votes of public interest group leaders). Simi-
larly, lawyers in "conservative" public interest litigation groups tend to be active in the Republican
Party. See O'Connor & Epstein, supra note 17, at 493-501 (recounting key roles played by promi-
nent Republicans such as Ed Meese, James Watt, Kit Bond, and various close Reagan advisors in rise
of "conservative public interest law firms").
264. In our system of separated powers and judicial review, "it is not uncommon for legislators to
believe that constitutional questions are none of their business at all." Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S.
CAL. L. REv. 661, 670 (1985). Consequently, representative bodies often do not adequately protect
constitutional rights, especially the constitutional rights of minorities. See generally D. MORGAN,
CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A STUDY OF RESPONSIBILITY (1966).
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tion against fee sharing in the new and different context of organized pub-
lic interest litigation.
But policy arguments are an uncertain basis for amending the fee-
sharing rule, because those who write the rules of ethics may not value
public interest groups, or public interest litigation, as highly as I do. Some
writers have attacked public interest groups for taking positions in litiga-
tion antithetical to the public at large2 5 and insensitive to the interests of
the individual clients they sponsor.266 Others have attacked public interest
groups for inviting courts to supplant the legislature and to undermine
our system of representative, majoritarian government.26 If the leaders of
the bar share these negative views about public interest litigation, then
they will not support an amendment to the fee-sharing rule that allows
public interest organizations to use legal services, in effect, as a fundrais-
ing device. If these negative views of public interest litigation prevail, the
bar is unlikely to amend the fee-sharing rule unless the Constitution re-
quires that the states allow lawyers to share fees with public interest orga-
nizations. I therefore turn to constitutional considerations.
IV. Do LAWYERS HAVE A FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SHARE
MARKET RATE FEES WITH PUBLIC INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS?
At the outset of this constitutional analysis, I want to assert two impor-
tant premises. The first premise is that constitutional rights of public in-
terest organizations and the lawyers who work with them are reciprocal.
When the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to public
interest organizations, it extended the same protection to their staff and
cooperating attorneys.2"" Thus, if lawyers have a First Amendment right
to enter into fee-sharing contracts with public interest organizations, then
public interest organizations have an equal and reciprocal right to condi-
265. See Lichter & Rothman, supra note 263, at 48 (reporting survey results suggesting that
public interest lawyers "often deviate from the outlook and perspectives of the general public"). Those
who believe that public interest groups do not truly represent the public have consequently formed
competing litigation organizations. See generally Houck, With Charity for All, 93 YALE L.J. 1415,
1454-1514 (1984) (discussing growth and variety of "business public interest law firms").
266. Bell, supra note 253, at 479-80 (court orders mandating racial balance may be educationally
disadvantageous, yet "civil rights lawyers continue to argue that black children are entitled to inte-
grated schools without regard to the educational effects of such assignments"). But see Correspon-
dence, 86 YALE L.J. 378, 381 (1976) (letter from Nathaniel Jones, then General Counsel to NAACP
Special Contribution Fund, arguing that "Professor Bell's allegation that civil rights lawyers do not
ethically represent the interests of the black community can scarcely stand").
267. See Rabkin, Public Interest Law: Is It Law in the "Public Interest"?, 8 HARV. J.L. & PuB.
POL'Y 341, 344 (1985) (arguing that courts are inappropriately being made into "fora for a pluralist
dialogue at the behest of public interest firms").
268. This has been true even when the attorneys have derived personal financial benefit from the
association's referrals. See Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377
U.S. 1, 5 & n.9 (1964) (protecting rights of attorneys to accept cases union solicited for them even
though attorneys received reasonable contingent fee for handling cases); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415, 420-21 (1963) (protecting rights of NAACP staff attorneys to solicit cases even though they were
paid $60 per day for working on NAACP-sponsored cases).
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tion employment or referrals on such contracts. This reciprocity of rights
is entirely logical. Attorneys could not freely associate with public interest
organizations if the organizations could be prosecuted for working with
them, and an organization's rights to supply attorneys for public interest
litigation would be empty if attorneys could be disciplined for working on
cases sponsored by the organizations.
The second premise is that the First Amendment rights of nonprofit
public interest organizations are at least as great as the First Amendment
rights of other nonprofit organizations. Although labor unions and other
nonprofit groups may be very different from public interest organizations
in purpose and composition, the Supreme Court has treated them equally
when discussing First Amendment rights regarding litigation.2 69 This
equal treatment is proper. The reasons for protecting First Amendment
rights of labor unions, charities, and other nonprofit groups apply with
equal force to the special genre of nonprofit groups known as public inter-
est organizations. If the Court has bestowed a First Amendment right on
a nonprofit labor union or charity, therefore, the same right extends to the
public interest organizations that are the subject of this Article. Against
the backdrop of these important premises, we can analyze the constitu-
tionality of the fee-sharing rule.
A. The First Amendment and Group Legal Services
Superficially, fee sharing appears to fall outside the scope of First
Amendment protection. Fee sharing is not literally "speech" and is unlike
the kinds of expressive activities the First Amendment has ordinarily pro-
tected. One could argue that fee sharing is mere "conduct," which the
First Amendment does not protect. This argument is weakened, however,
by a line of Supreme Court cases over the past twenty-five years directly
addressing group legal services. In these cases, the Court generally re-
jected the speech/conduct distinction and extended First Amendment pro-
tection far beyond traditional forms of speech, petition, assembly, and as-
sociation. Most pertinent here, the group legal services cases accorded
First Amendment protection to several financial arrangements between
lawyers and public interest groups.
The seminal case about group legal services, NAACP v. Button,270 was
the first case to extend First Amendment protection to a financial relation-
ship between lawyers and a public interest group. In Button, the NAACP
269. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 222 (1967) (noting that
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), and Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel.
Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964), alike dealt with "the right of an association to provide legal
services for its members"); Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 8 (asserting that union's activities "fall just as
clearly within the protection of the First Amendment" as the NAACP's, and that "the Constitution
protects the associational rights of the members of the union precisely as it does those of the
NAACP").
270. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
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challenged a Virginia statute that prohibited any group from financing
litigation or recommending attorneys for litigation in which the group was
not a party and had no pecuniary interest.217' The issue was not simply
whether the NAACP had a First Amendment right to recommend attor-
neys, but whether it had the right to recommend attorneys on the
NAACP's own payroll.272 Virginia argued that it could prohibit the
NAACP from recommending attorneys in its own employ, because the
NAACP's financial leverage over its staff attorneys gave the NAACP too
much control over the litigation. 7' The state urged that the statute was
needed to insure high professional standards, and thus fell "within the
traditional purview of state regulation of professional conduct. '2 74
The Supreme Court disagreed. For the NAACP, the Court said, litiga-
tion was "not a technique of resolving private differences," but rather "a
form of political expression. '2 75 Without stopping to distinguish among or
define the contours of various First Amendment rights, the Court held
that the NAACP's sponsorship of litigation fell within the scope of First
Amendment protection for speech, freedom of association, and the right to
petition government for the redress of grievances. 76 Accordingly, the First
Amendment protected the NAACP's "entire arrangement"-inluding its
financial sponsorship of cases, its direct solicitation of plaintiffs, its recom-
mendation of its staff attorneys, and its payment of those attorneys.2 7
The Button case involved the rights of a group to sponsor constitutional
litigation. The next step for group legal services was to extend the protec-
tions of Button to federal statutory litigation having no constitutional
271. This statute prohibited the NAACP from financing and providing attorneys for school deseg-
regation suits. See id. at 419-26.
272. At oral argument, the Court asked the NAACP's attorney, Robert Carter (now a federal
judge), whether the NAACP advised potential plaintiffs that it would not finance litigation "unless
they go to NAACP [staff] lawyers." Mr. Carter replied: "[Tihat's exactly what the case would reduce
itself to, your Honor." Tr. of Oral Arg. at 11 (reargument). At another point in the oral argument,
one of the Justices (not identified by name) said:
As far as I'm concerned, you should argue. . . that the NAACP, for the purpose of protecting
and asserting the constitutional rights of Negroes in the courts, through lawyers, for that rea-
son set up an arrangement under which your organization and its Fund hired lawyers at
special rates. Your case has to stand on the basis that you do recommend those lawyers, and
that the statute which restricts you from doing so either is or is not a violation of constitutional
rights. As far as I'm concerned, I see no other way to decide this case.
Id. at 18-19 (emphasis added).
In later cases, the Supreme Court stressed that the NAACP's staff attorneys were "actually em-
ployed by the association which recommended them," Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex
rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 7 (1964), or were "actually paid by the association," United Mine
Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221 (1967), or were "'organized as a staff and
paid by' that organization," In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 429 (1978) (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at
434).
273. Tr. of Oral Arg. at 27, Button (No. 62-5) (reargument). Virginia argued that NAACP staff
attorneys had to "keep on the good side of the chairman" or they would not be reelected to the
NAACP's legal staff the following year. Id.
274. Button, 371 U.S. at 438.
275. Id. at 429.
276. Id. at 429-30.
277. Id. at 442 (emphasis added).
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overtones. The Court took this large step, over a vehement dissent, in
Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar."8 The case involved a solicitation and referral plan designed to pro-
tect injured railroad workers against greedy and incompetent lawyers.
Under the plan, the union maintained a legal department that investigated
railway accidents and recommended that injured union members retain a
lawyer the union had selected based on competence and experience.
Lower courts had repeatedly outlawed various versions of this plan,27 9 but
the Supreme Court gave the plan constitutional protection. Again fusing
(and perhaps confusing) various First Amendment rights, the Court held
that "the First Amendment's guarantees of free speech, petition and as-
sembly give railroad workers the right to gather together for the lawful
purpose of helping and advising one another in asserting the rights Con-
gress gave them."280
The Court soon invoked Button and Trainmen to protect a union's
right to hire a staff attorney to serve union members free of charge. In
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Association,2 " the only issue
was whether the union could "hire attorneys on a salary basis to assist its
members in the assertion of their legal rights."2 2 The state court had held
that the union could not employ an attorney to serve its members, because
"any 'financial connection of any kind'" between the union and the at-
torneys was illegal.283 The Supreme Court reversed. The record did not
show that the financial connection between the union and the staff had
harmed clients, the profession, or the public.284 Moreover, by flatly
prohibiting any financial connection between attorneys and the union, the
state court's decree would have prohibited even the arrangements already
approved in Button and Trainmen. The Court therefore struck down the
decree on First Amendment grounds."8 5
Financial connections were again at issue in United Transportation
Union v. State Bar,2 8' another case challenging the trainmen's plan.
287
The union demanded that the attorneys it recommended agree to charge
no more than twenty-five percent of any recovery, and to reimburse union
278. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
279. See, e.g., In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933); In re Brotherhood of R.R. Train-
men, 13 Ill. 2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958). Only one court had ever upheld the plan. See Ryan v.
Pennsylvania R.R., 268 Ill. App. 364 (1932).
280. Trainmen, 377 U.S. at 5.
281. 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
282. Id. at 222 (emphasis added). The Court's opinion was "limited to this one aspect of the
Union's activities." Id. at 218 n.1.
283. Id. at 225 (quoting 35 Ill. 2d 112, 118, 219 N.E.2d 503, 506 (1966)) (emphasis added).
284. Id.
285. The Court held that the First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition gave
the union this right. Id. at 222.
286. 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
287. The case was originally filed against the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, but in 1969 the
Brotherhood merged into the newly created United Transportation Union. See id. at 577 & n.1.
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representatives for transporting injured workers to the attorneys' of-
fices.288 Although neither practice directly involved speech or political ex-
pression, the Court rejected the state's challenges to both practices. In the
context of the union's overall plan, the Court held that transporting in-
jured workers was protected by the union members' First Amendment
right to "help and advise each other in securing effective legal representa-
tion."2 " Limiting contingent fees, similarly, was part of the First Amend-
ment right "to act collectively to obtain affordable and effective legal
representation."290
A contingent financial relationship between a lawyer and a public in-
terest organization was examined by the Court in In re Primus,"1 the
most recent case in the Button line. In Primus, the state disciplined a
lawyer for soliciting a case on behalf of the ACLU, which stood to make a
"profit" by requesting attorney fees if the plaintiff prevailed. 92 The Su-
preme Court held that this possible financial benefit to the ACLU was an
inadequate basis for discipline and did not take the ACLU out of the
protection of Button.293 On the contrary, the Court viewed the possible
benefit to the ACLU as a virtue because it meant that the attorney herself
had no financial interest in the case. Specifically, the Court emphasized
that "even if there had been an award during the period in question, it
would have gone to the central fund of the ACLU, ' 294 and that "any
award of counsel fees would have been received only for the organization's
benefit,"29 not for the benefit of the attorney personally." 8 Because the
288. See id. at 577-78. The Court discussed some other alleged practices as well, but either gave
them less prominence or disposed of the allegations without reaching the merits.
289. Id. at 582. The Court stated:
The Union conceded that . . . Union representatives were reimbursed [by the attorneys] for
their actual time spent and out-of-pocket expenses incurred in bringing injured members or
their families to the offices of the legal counsel. Since the members of a union have a First
Amendment right to help and advise each other in securing effective legal representation, there
can be no doubt that transportation of injured members to an attorney's office is within the
scope of that protected activity.
Id. (emphasis added).
290. Id. at 584 (citing United Mine Workers). Justice Harlan's separate opinion in United
Transportation Union criticized the majority for extending First Amendment protection to a mere
economic arrangement-to nothing more than "a combination of purchasers of services seeking to
increase their market power." Id. at 599 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). To
Harlan, the relationship of this plan to First Amendment interests was "remote at best." Id.
291. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
292. Id. at 418-20 & n.10.
293. Id. at 429.
294. Id. at 430 (footnote omitted). The footnote quoted the ACLU's policy that cooperating attor-
neys could never personally receive any payment for rendering legal services in cases sponsored by the
ACLU. See also Record at 188, In re Smith, 268 S.C. 259, 233 S.E.2d 301 (1977), rev. sub nom. In
re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (transcript of Ms. Primus's disciplinary hearing) (quoting undisputed
testimony that attorney fee award "goes into the organization and not to the attorney"). In 1977, after
the solicitation in Primus occurred, the ACLU changed this policy so that local affiliates could, if they
wished, allow cooperating attorneys to keep part of the fees. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 430 n.24.
295. 436 U.S. at 428 n.21 (discipline was based "solely on the possibility that appellant's solicita-
tion might have conferred a financial benefit on the ACLU").
296. See id. at 428-29 ("It is conceded that appellant received no compensation for any of the
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disciplined attorney was motivated by ideology and not by pecuniary gain,
her solicitation fell squarely within her right to engage in political expres-
sion and association through litigation.297
Read together, the group legal services cases from Button through
Primus establish First Amendment protection for financial arrangements
between lawyers and public interest organizations whenever those ar-
rangements are integral to an organization's purposes."'8 If fee-sharing
agreements are integral to the litigation programs of public interest
groups-and my survey suggests that they are-then fee-sharing arrange-
ments fall within the protection of the First Amendment. In United Mine
Workers, the Court warned against "indirect restraints" on freedom of
expression that did not prohibit speech, petition, or assembly "as such." '299
The blanket prohibition on fee sharing is the kind of indirect restraint
that could infringe on First Amendment rights by impeding the associa-
tion of attorneys and public interest organizations for purposes of
litigation.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has never expressly extended First
Amendment protection to fee-sharing arrangements with nonprofit
groups. On the contrary, the Court has repeatedly refused to decide
whether fee-sharing agreements fall within the First Amendment's scope.
In Trainmen, for example, the dissent attacked the union for sharing legal
fees, noting that the union had for many years required regional counsel
to share twenty-five percent of their fees with the union.300 The decree
below had enjoined the union from sharing fees with recommended law-
yers and from permitting fee sharing with its nonlawyer investigators, but
the majority did not reach the fee-sharing issue because the union had
agreed to comply with the injunction against fee sharing.301 In United
Transportation Union, the lower court had enjoined the union from
"sharing in any manner in the legal fees of any lawyer or countenancing
the splitting of or sharing in such fees with any layman or lay agency,"
30 2
activities in question."). The state conjectured that Ms. Primus might enhance her reputation through
her ACLU work, and thus generate increased foundation support for her own work, but even the
state court had found no evidence that Ms. Primus acted on her own behalf. See id. at 428 n.21 (citing
lower court opinion).
297. See id. at 428-32 & n.24 (because Ms. Primus was not motivated by personal gain, her
letter of solicitation fell "within the generous zone of First Amendment protection reserved for associa-
tional freedoms").
298. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrTuTiONAL LAW § 12-26, at 1015-16 (2d ed.
1988) (defining "integral activity" as any activity-specifically including litigation or referrals by
nonprofit groups-"integral to the association in the sense that the association's protected purposes
would be significantly frustrated were the activity disallowed").
299. 389 U.S. at 222. Justice Harlan urged the Court to distinguish expression from conduct, see
id. at 225-34 (Harlan, J., dissenting), stating in particular that "litigation is more than speech; it is
conduct," id. at 226, but the majority again rejected the invitation.
300. See 377 U.S. at 9, 11.
301. See id. at 5 n.9.
302. 401 U.S. at 579 n.4.
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and the dissent would have upheld this provision of the decree. 03 The
majority did not argue that fee sharing was protected by the First Amend-
ment, but pointed out that the record contained "not a line of evidence"
concerning fee sharing.
3 0 4
The case that comes closest to protecting fee-sharing arrangements is
Primus, in which the ACLU was to receive any attorney fees awarded in
the underlying case. 05 But for several reasons, the Primus case cannot be
read as a blanket endorsement of all fee-sharing arrangements between
lawyers and public interest groups. First, the conduct at issue in Primus
occurred before Congress passed section 1988.306 Under pre-section 1988
law, the ACLU itself would have applied for and received any fee award
directly.3 07 The attorney handling the litigation would neither have re-
ceived the fee award personally nor formally assigned it to the organiza-
tion, and thus would not have "shared" fees with the organization. Conse-
quently, the situation in Primus did not involve fee sharing per se, the
state did not charge Ms. Primus with violating the fee-sharing rule, and
the Court never mentioned the rule against sharing fees with
nonlawyers.30 8
Second, the attorney who handled the case solicited by Ms. Primus was
not a full-time staff attorney. He was either a part-time staff attorney or
an unsalaried cooperating attorney (the record is unclear on this point), 0 9
and in either case had income and clients independent of the ACLU. This
is significant. A public interest group has little leverage over an attorney
with an independent livelihood, especially one who will not personally
receive any fees even if the client prevails.
Third, Primus expressly refused to decide whether its decision might
have been different if the ACLU had been sharing fees with its cooperat-
ing attorneys. 10 "We are not presented in this case," the Court observed,
303. Id. at 598 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
304. Id. at 583.
305. See 436 U.S. at 430 (noting that any fee award "would have gone to the central fund of the
ACLU").
306. The solicitation letter that formed the "centerpiece" of the litigation was dated August 30,
1973. See id. at 416 & n.6.
307. See, e.g., Torres v. Sachs, 69 F.R.D. 343 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), affd, 538 F.2d 10 (2d Cir. 1976)
(discussing fee awards to groups before passage of section 1988); see also supra text accompanying
notes 114-32 (same).
308. It is important to note that neither Ms. Primus nor the attorney who actually handled the
case on the ACLU's behalf was charged with violating the rule against sharing fees with a nonlawyer.
Rather, she was charged only with improper solicitation, including solicitation on behalf of a group
that would benefit financially from the solicited suit. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 417-21.
309. See id. at 415 n.3 (describing Ms. Primus and her associate Carlton Bagby as "unsalaried
cooperating attorneys," and her associate Herbert Buhl as "staff counsel" for ACLU); Walker v.
Pierce, 560 F.2d 609, 610 (4th Cir. 1977) (listing Carlton Bagby as counsel of record on appeal), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1075 (1978).
310. 436 U.S. at 430 n.24. The Court noted that the ACLU had historically insisted on keeping
all fees for itself to guard against the possibility that cooperating attorneys would accept only those
cases likely to produce fees. In 1977, however, the ACLU changed policies, permitting affiliates to
experiment by allowing cooperating attorneys to retain part of the fees. The South Carolina ACLU
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"with a situation where the income of the lawyer who solicits the prospec-
tive litigant or who engages in the actual representation of the solicited
client rises or falls with the outcome of the particular litigation." '' Thus,
even if Primus implies First Amendment protection for a cooperating at-
torney's agreement to share all fees with a public interest group, it might
not protect a cooperating attorney's agreement to share only part of a fee
award. The abstract logic of Primus should protect partial fee sharing,
but there is one plausible distinction. A cooperating attorney becomes vul-
nerable to losing income-and thus more subject to an organization's con-
trol-to the extent she will be sharing in any fee award.
Finally, the Primus case did not address the situation of the full-time
staff attorney who has agreed to turn over all court-awarded fees to the
organization. Primus, therefore, does not definitively establish comprehen-
sive First Amendment protection for fee-sharing arrangements with public
interest groups.
To determine whether the First Amendment protects fee sharing with
public interest groups, we need to undertake two inquiries. First, we need
to examine more carefully the policies underlying the First Amendment
rights articulated in the group legal services cases from Button through
Primus. Second, if the policies indicate that fee sharing is protected by the
First Amendment, we need to apply the standard that the state must meet
in order to justify an infringement on First Amendment rights. Should the
infringement prove unjustified, it should convince the bar, the legislatures,
and the courts to reexamine the present restrictions on fee sharing with
public interest groups.
B. Policies Underlying the Group Legal Services Cases
The group legal services cases express two related policies. One policy
is to assist nonprofit organizations in their efforts to extend "low-cost, ef-
fective legal representation" to individual litigants.3" 2 As the Court said in
United Transportation Union, the "common thread" running through the
group legal services cases is that "collective activity undertaken to obtain
meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment," '313 and this fundamental right "would be a
hollow promise if courts could deny associations of workers or others the
means of enabling their members to meet the costs of legal representa-
chapter had not adopted any such fee-sharing arrangement, so the new policy did not come into play
in Primus. The Court therefore was careful to "express no opinion whether our analysis in this case
would be different had the latter policy been in effect during the period in question." Id.
311. Id. at 436 n.30 (citing id. at 428-31 & n.24) (emphasis added). The italicized language
indicates that the Court had in mind lawyers whose incomes would rise if they successfully repre-
sented clients solicited by others. That dictum would encompass lawyers who agree to share only part
of any court-awarded fees with nonprofit groups in cases solicited by the groups.
312. Id. at 426 (citing Trainmen, United Mine Workers, and United Transportation Union).
313. 401 U.S. at 585.
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tion."314 A second policy of the group legal services cases is to foster polit-
ical expression by minority groups. The cases express the Court's belief
that associating to sponsor litigation is often "the most effective form of
political association" for minorities, 15 and may even be "the sole practica-
ble avenue open to a minority to petition for redress of grievances."31 6
Fee-sharing arrangements further both policies.
1. Low-Cost Legal Services
Fee-sharing agreements help to extend low-cost legal representation to
all citizens by helping public interest groups generate funds. The more
money an organization has to hire staff attorneys, to recruit and train
cooperating attorneys, and to finance the expenses of litigation, the more
cases the organization can handle or supervise. Since public interest orga-
nizations do not charge clients for legal services,317 fee-sharing agreements
help people obtain low-cost legal representation. The bar has long recog-
nized that fee-sharing agreements are an appropriate way of financing
lawyer referral services,3 8 and they are an equally appropriate vehicle for
financing public interest groups.
One could arguably distinguish fee sharing on the grounds that agree-
ments to share market rate fees will raise the cost of legal services to the
defendants paying the fees.31 ' If fee-sharing agreements are allowed, de-
fendants who do not prevail in public interest cases will pay market fees
rather than only the actual cost of legal services.320 And the lure of market
314. Id. at 585-86 (emphasis added). The Court added that this "was the holding in United Mine
Workers, Trainmen, and NAACP v. Button." Id. at 586. The phrase "or others" and the citation to
Button make clear that the holding was not confined to labor unions.
315. Button, 371 U.S. at 431.
316. Id. at 430. Sometimes the interests of the members and the interests of the individual liti-
gants are essentially congruent. In Button, for example, the Court took the position that the aims and
interests of the NAACP were not in conflict with the interests of the litigants for whom the NAACP
provided attorneys and financing. See id. at 443.
317. Public interest law firms often do charge for their services, but the states have not questioned
fee-sharing agreements within public interest law firms.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 96-104.
319. Moreover, defendants may attempt to pass these costs along to the public. When a govern-
mental defendant is ordered to pay fees to a prevailing plaintiff, or when the government has agreed
to pay a fee award, the taxpayers bear the cost of the award directly because the government's money
comes from taxes and fees of some kind. Even if taxes are not increased to pay the award, other
governmental services may be cut back, making legal fees a relatively higher portion of the govern-
ment's budget. When a private employer is ordered to pay fees to a prevailing plaintiff, the employer
will attempt to pass on the cost of a fee award to consumers. However, a private company can pass
along the cost to consumers only if the demand for the company's products or services is inelastic. A
company that cannot pass along the costs may become less profitable, and the shareholders will ulti-
mately bear the cost of the fee award.
320. Fees based on market rates appear to be nearly double the amount of fees based solely on
cost plus overhead. See, e.g., Goodrich v. Department of the Navy, 733 F.2d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(awarding only $1958.64 based on cost plus overhead, rather than $3675 requested by attorney based
on market rate), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); Sabey v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 36 (1984)
(awarding only $38 per hour based on cost plus overhead, rather than $75 per hour request based on
market rate).
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rate fees will result in more cases, increasing defense costs still further.321
But this line of argument distorts the group legal services cases. The
group legal services cases allow associations to lower the cost of providing
competent lawyers to individuals, not to entities such as railroads or
school boards. As long as fee-sharing agreements help individual litigants
meet the cost of legal services and obtain meaningful access to the courts,
the cost of defending against public interest lawsuits is constitutionally
irrelevant.322
2. Political Expression for Minorities
Fee-sharing agreements also facilitate political expression by minorities.
According to the Court's jurisprudence in the group legal services cases,
the First Amendment rights to petition for a redress of grievances, to as-
semble peaceably, and to engage in free speech, "though not identical, are
inseparable.11 2 3 Fee-sharing arrangements assist public interest organiza-
tions in carrying out their right to associate (that is, to assemble) for the
purpose of litigation (that is, petitioning the government for redress of
grievances), and this litigation is a form of political expression (that is,
free speech). Without the right to share legal fees, the resources for engag-
ing in political expression through organized litigation programs would be
far more limited. The Court's group legal services cases were intended to
expand, not limit, public interest litigation.
I conclude that fee-sharing agreements between lawyers and public in-
terest groups directly serve the policies that have led the Court to extend
First Amendment protection to a variety of financial arrangements be-
tween lawyers and public interest groups. The only remaining inquiry is
whether the state can advance countervailing interests to justify a restric-
tion on First Amendment liberties.
321. In addition, defense costs may increase because the greater incentive of market rate fees will
encourage plaintiffs' attorneys to spend more hours on each case in which a plaintiff is likely to
prevail.
322. The conclusion that higher defense costs are irrelevant to a First Amendment analysis seems
inescapable because defense costs increase whenever plaintiffs obtain greater access to the courts.
Whether the defense costs increase because plaintiffs bring more suits or because each individual suit
is more expensive, or both, has never concerned the Supreme Court in First Amendment cases.
323. United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at 222 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945)). Because of this inseparability, the group legal services cases discuss First Amendment rights
in many different permutations and combinations, as if they were interconnected or interchangeable.
In Button, for example, the Court referred at various times to the First Amendment rights of "expres-
sion and association," "advocacy," "political expression," "petitioning for the redress of grievances,"
"orderly group activity," "the right 'to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and
ideas,'" and "association for litigation." 371 U.S. at 428-31. Sometimes, the Court melded various
rights together into a unified whole. See supra text accompanying notes 276 & 280.
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C. The Constitutional Test
To overcome the First Amendment right to share legal fees with public
interest organizations, the state must satisfy the stringent First Amend-
ment test applied in the context of political speech. 2 This test has two
independent components. First, the state must advance a compelling rea-
son for any significant infringement on First Amendment rights. 25 Sec-
ond, even if the state can articulate a compelling interest, it must still
regulate with precision,326 using regulatory measures that directly advance
the state's interests327 and that restrict First Amendment freedoms as little
as possible.328
Applying this two-pronged test to the fee-sharing rule is relatively easy.
As we have seen, the state's interests in avoiding excessive fees is a non
sequitur in the context of public interest litigation,329 and its interest in
preventing nonlawyers from stirring up litigation is constitutionally irrele-
vant.330 The state's interests in preventing abusive methods of solicitation,
unauthorized practice, improper referrals, and unethical litigation prac-
tices are potentially compelling but wholly speculative because there is no
evidence that fee-sharing agreements are causing any of these evils. 3 3 ' In
324. The rational basis or "reasonable relationship" test does not apply if an activity has First
Amendment protection. For that reason, the Court rejected the reasonable relationship test in Button.
Justice Harlan, believing that litigation was primarily conduct rather than speech, favored a test
under which a regulation "not directly suppressing speech or peaceable assembly, but having some
impact on the form or manner of their exercise will be sustained if the regulation has a reasonable
relationship to a proper governmental objective and does not unduly interfere with such individual
rights." Button, 371 U.S. at 454 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). The majority, however,
considered the reasonable relationship test too weak to protect First Amendment liberties. Id. at 438.
325. See, e.g., Button, 371 U.S. at 438 ("The decisions of this Court have consistently held that
only a compelling state interest . . . can justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.").
326. See, e.g., id. at 438 ("[plrecision of regulation must be the touchstone" in First Amendment
area).
327. See, e.g., Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 636-39 (1980)
(striking down municipal ordinance because it only "peripherally promoted" and was "insufficiently
related" to substantial state interests at which law was supposedly aimed).
328. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("The breadth of legislative abridg-
ment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." (footnote
omitted)). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.10, at
848 (3d ed. 1986) (even when law is intended to further substantial government interest, Court "re-
quires that the legislation use means which are the 'least restrictive' of free speech"). First Amend-
ment doctrine also allows a plaintiff to attack a regulation under the "overbreadth" doctrine if the
regulation may substantially impinge anyone's First Amendment rights, even if it would be constitu-
tional as applied to the plaintiff. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-16 (1973)
(explaining rationale for doctrine); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) ("[T]he transcen-
dent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks
on overly broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his
own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specificity." (citation
omitted)); Button, 371 U.S. at 432 (law may be invalid "if it prohibits privileged exercises of First
Amendment rights whether or not . . . the petitioner has engaged in privileged conduct").
329. See supra text accompanying notes 219-25.
330. See supra text accompanying notes 204-08.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 209-13 (discussing abusive methods of solicitation),
214-18 (discussing unauthorized practice), 226-30 (discussing improper referrals) & 231-38 (discuss-
ing unethical litigation practices).
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any event, the state could attack every one of these evils through far less
restrictive measures than a blanket ban on fee sharing between lawyers
and public interest groups.33 2
The only interest of any real consequence underlying the fee-sharing
prohibition is the state's interest in protecting the attorney-client relation-
ship against interference by nonlawyers. Although I have already dis-
cussed the attorney-client relationship from the standpoint of policy, 3 ' the
importance and complexity of this interest makes it worth revisiting from
a constitutional perspective.
1. Compelling State Interests
In all of the group legal services cases, the Supreme Court has made
clear that public interest organizations may not control litigation or cause
serious conflicts for their attorneys.3 4 In Button, for example, the Court
struck down Virginia's statute partly because the state had made "no
showing of a serious danger . . . of professionally reprehensible conflicts
of interest which rules against solicitation frequently seek to prevent. '33 1
Conversely, the state's interest apparently would have been compelling if
the record had permitted "an inference of any injurious intervention in or
control of litigation. 33 8
This focus on conflicts or control continued in United Mine Workers337
and Primus. Generally, the Court insists on a showing of actual harm
before a state can take action that abridges First Amendment rights,338 but
332. See supra text accompanying notes 211-12 (abusive solicitation), 216-18 (unauthorized
practice), 223-25 (excessive fees), 229-30 (improper referrals) & 236-38 (unethical litigation
practices).
333. See supra text accompanying notes 239-59.
334. This premise deserves serious reexamination, for it is built on a conception of the attorney-
client relationship that may not be well suited to public interest litigation. One could argue, for exam-
ple, that a public interest organization's decision not to settle a case should take precedence over the
client's views. This would be contrary to the current rules of legal ethics, which provide that lawyers
"shall abide by a client's decision whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter." MODEL
RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.2(a). But giving precedence to the organization's views would ensure
that the narrow, parochial interests of an individual client would not override the public interest in
establishing an important precedent or bringing facts to light through the public forum of the court-
room. Cf. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1085 (1984) ("Parties might settle while
leaving justice undone."). This Article is not the proper place to explore this argument fully, but I am
working on a separate piece examining the attorney-client relationship in public interest litigation.
335. 371 U.S. at 443.
336. Id. at 444. Justice White's separate opinion in Button also condemned the control of litiga-
tion by nonlawyer organizations. Had Virginia's law proscribed only "the actual day-to-day manage-
ment and dictation of the tactics, strategy, and conduct of litigation by a lay entity such as the
NAACP," Justice White would have voted to uphold it. Id. at 447 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). In his mind, "neither the practice of law by such an organization nor its manage-
ment of the litigation of its members or others is constitutionally protected." Id.
337. See 389 U.S. at 224 (finding "no indication that the theoretically imaginable divergence be-
tween the interests of union and member ever actually arose in the context of a particular lawsuit").
338. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 434 (showing of potential danger may suffice to infringe First
Amendment rights in context of commercial affairs, but attorneys exercising protected freedoms of
association and expression may not be disciplined unless their conduct "in fact involved the type of
misconduct" at which regulation is aimed); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 n.20
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the Primus Court suggested that a "'serious danger' of conflict of interest
or of organizational interference with the actual conduct of the litiga-
tion"-as opposed to actual harm-would justify an infringement.3 39
Under this dictum, the precise question is whether fee-sharing arrange-
ments create a "serious danger" that organizations will create conflicts of
interest or attempt to exert control over the actual conduct of litigation,
thus justifying state interference without waiting for actual harm.340
As an intuitive matter, fee sharing would seem to increase the likeli-
hood of injurious lay interference with the attorney-client relationship be-
cause fee-sharing agreements strengthen the incentive for organizations to
control litigation. As the Court pointed out in Button: "Objection to the
intervention of a lay intermediary, who may control litigation or otherwise
interfere with the rendering of legal services . . . derives from the element
of pecuniary gain.'" The Court discounted the danger of conflicts in
Button "because no monetary stakes are involved, and so there is no dan-
ger that the attorney will desert or subvert the paramount interests of his
client to enrich himself or an outside sponsor. '342 Fee sharing, however,
reinstates the missing element of pecuniary gain, and the accompanying
danger that the attorney will enrich the sponsor at the expense of the
client. Ideological commitment on the part of public interest organizations
only heightens the incentives to control litigation. As Justice Rehnquist
suggested in Primus, the danger of harm to the attorney-client relation-
ship is not minimized "simply because a lawyer proceeds from political
conviction rather than for pecuniary gain." 3"3
If logic alone were sufficient, this train of reasoning would demonstrate
a compelling interest in prohibiting fee sharing with staff attorneys. But
logic is not enough. In the group legal services cases, the Court has con-
sidered historical or empirical evidence essential to establishing a compel-
ling state interest. In United Mine Workers, for example, the Court struck
down a blanket prohibition against hiring staff attorneys because, in the
many years the program had been in operation, there had come to light
"not one single instance of abuse, of harm to clients, of any actual disad-
(1978) ("We hold today in Primus that a lawyer who engages in solicitation as a form of protected
political association generally may not be disciplined without proof of actual wrongdoing that the
State constitutionally may proscribe." (emphasis added)).
339. 436 U.S. at 436 (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at 443) (citations omitted, emphasis added). This
suggestion was a step toward endorsing Justice Harlan's belief that states could constitutionally em-
ploy prophylactic measures to ward off "foreseeable abuses." See United Mine Workers, 389 U.S. at
232-33 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
340. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 436-39 (discussing justifications for state regulation of lawyers
associated with nonprofit groups).
341. 371 U.S. at 441 (emphasis added).
342. Id. at 443 (emphasis added).
343. 436 U.S. at 445 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). This ideological commitment motivated the
NAACP and the ACLU to exert control over the selection of plaintiffs and attorneys in both Button,
see 371 U.S. at 448-50 (Harlan, J., dissenting), and Primus, see 436 U.S. at 416 n.6 (letter to
plaintiff).
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vantage to the public or to the profession" growing out of the financial
connection between the union and its staff attorney.344 If the state cannot
produce historical or empirical evidence that fee sharing between lawyers
and nonlawyers leads to improper conflicts or control, then the danger of
fee sharing with staff lawyers must not be as great as logic suggests, and
the state's interest is not compelling.345
2. Precision of Regulation
Even if the danger to the attorney-client relationship did constitute a
compelling state interest, the state would also have to show that a blanket
prohibition on fee sharing between staff attorneys and public interest
groups regulates with precision-that it is a "carefully tailored regulation
that does not abridge unnecessarily the associational freedoms of nonprofit
organizations."346 The blanket prohibition against fee sharing cannot pass
this test because it is overinclusive in the conduct it regulates and does not
use the least restrictive means to attack the evil it seeks to eliminate.
The fee-sharing rule is overinclusive because it regulates all types of fee
sharing even though some types of fee sharing do not threaten serious evil.
Specifically, the rule prohibits fee sharing with cooperating attorneys as
well as with staff attorneys, even though only fee sharing with staff attor-
neys poses any serious likelihood of injurious lay interference with the
attorney-client relationship. 47 Because the rule uses fee sharing as a
proxy for evil, even though there is not necessarily any direct connection
between fee sharing and injurious interference, the rule sweeps too
broadly.
A line of charitable fundraising cases demonstrates that the Court will
not tolerate such overinclusiveness in the First Amendment area. In Vil-
lage of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment,,8 for example,
the Court considered a nonprofit advocacy group's First Amendment chal-
344. 389 U.S. at 225.
345. The state's historical evidence also will have to be directly related to the fee-sharing agree-
ments at issue in a particular case. Otherwise, the evidence might be irrelevant or insufficient. In
Trainmen, for example, Justice Clark argued that the past history of the union, including fee sharing
and other unethical practices, justified the state's regulation of the union's plan: "[T]his identical
union plan has been before several other courts and, while the union has repeatedly promised to
reform, as here, it has consistently renewed the same practices." 377 U.S. at 11 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted). The majority ignored this argument. In United Transportation Union, Justice
Harlan recounted cases from Illinois and Virginia presenting a history of abuses in the union's plan,
including the unethical sharing of legal fees. See 401 U.S. at 586-93 (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part). The majority brushed off this history, saying that it presented "other cases
involving other parties in other courts." Id. at 583.
346. See Primus, 436 U.S. at 439 (noting that Court's opinion should not be read to foreclose
such regulation).
347. See supra text accompanying notes 245-51 & 341-45. Even fee sharing with staff attorneys,
however, poses only a hypothetical danger because there is virtually no empirical evidence of injurious
lay interference with staff attorneys for public interest organizations. See supra text accompanying
notes 344-45.
348. 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
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lenge to a municipal ordinance that prohibited door-to-door solicitation by
organizations applying more than twenty-five percent of their receipts to
salaries and other noncharitable purposes.349 The Court invalidated the
ordinance on its face because a substantial number of groups within the
ambit of the statute did not cause any of the evils the state sought to
prevent. This broad sweep was unacceptable because the government may
not lump together bona fide organizations with fraudulent ones, and "re-
fuse to employ more precise measures to separate one kind from the
other."350 By analogy, the state may not lump together all forms of fee
sharing and refuse to separate the dangerous kinds from the harmless
kinds.
The Court used a similar analysis in another charitable fundraising
case, Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co.35 Munson, a profes-
sional for-profit fundraiser,'52 challenged a statute that prohibited charita-
ble organizations from paying anyone more than twenty-five percent of
the amount raised in connection with any fundraising activity. 5 3 As in
Schaumburg, the Court found the statute invalid on its face. The flaw in
the statute was "a fundamentally mistaken premise that high solicitation
costs are an accurate measure of fraud." '' The premise that all fee-
sharing arrangements lead to a serious danger of injurious interference
with the attorney-client relationship is similarly mistaken.
Even as to those fee-sharing arrangements that do pose a danger to the
attorney-client relationship, the fee-sharing rule is invalid because it is
flawed by another type of imprecision. It fails to employ the least restric-
tive means to attack the evil at which it is aimed. This type of imprecision
was stressed by the Schaumburg Court, which set down the general rule
that challenged regulations are constitutionally flawed, even when sup-
ported by constitutionally sufficient government interests, unless the regu-
lations promote the governmental interests directly rather than "peripher-
ally." '55 After examining the interests allegedly served by the ordinance at
349. See id. at 622.
350. Id. at 637. The Court implied that states could impose restrictions on organizations that
were "using the charitable label as a cloak for profitmaking." Id. The Court supported its analysis
with a well-known quotation from Button: "Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression
are suspect. Precision of regulation must be the touchstone . I..." d. (quoting Button, 371 U.S. at
438). The village's ordinance failed this test because it was "insufficiently related to the governmental
interests asserted in its support to justify its interference with protected speech." 444 U.S. at 639.
351. 467 U.S. 947 (1984).
352. See id. at 950.
353. See id. at 950-51. The statute at issue in Munson had greater flexibility than the ordinance
struck down in Schaumburg. For example, the Maryland statute allowed a waiver of the 25% limita-
tion for a charity that could demonstrate financial necessity. For the full text of the challenged statute,
see id. at 950 n.2.
354. Id. at 966; see also id. at 961 (discussing Schaumburg). More recently, the Court struck
down still another charitable fundraising statute because there was a "missing nexus" between the
statutory restrictions and the state's interests. See Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 108 S.Ct.
2667, 2675 (1988).
355. 444 U.S. at 636.
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issue in Schaumburg, the Court concluded that the village could further
these interests through less intrusive measures. 56
The state can likewise prevent public interest groups from interfering
with the attorney-client relationship through less intrusive measures than
a blanket prohibition on fee sharing. The most obvious of these alternative
measures is more vigorous enforcement of existing codes of legal ethics,
which zealously guard a lawyer's independent professional judgment from
outside interference and affirmatively require lawyers to serve their clients
loyally.357 Another measure would be revising state or federal tax laws to
prohibit tax-exempt organizations from exerting pressure on an attorney
or client in a sponsored case in order to increase the amount or likelihood
of a fee award.358 A third alternative would be to amend (or enforce) state
laws and regulations governing nonprofit corporations and associations so
that public interest organizations would be barred from exerting control
over the conduct of litigation or interfering with the attorney-client
relationship. 359
These alternatives may be more difficult to enforce than a blanket ban
on fee sharing,3 0 but the Supreme Court has emphasized that "the First
Amendment does not permit the State to sacrifice speech for efficiency." ' 1
Consequently, even in purely commercial contexts, the Court has ordina-
rily rejected enforcement difficulties as a justification for broadly drawn
356. For example, the village's interest in preventing fraud could be served through disclosure
requirements and penal laws against fraud, and its interest in public safety was unrelated to the
regulation. 444 U.S. at 637-38.
357. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.7 comment ("Loyalty is an essential element in the
lawyer's relationship to a client."); id. Rule 1.8(0(2) (requiring lawyer who accepts compensation
from one other than client to ensure that "there is no interference with the lawyer's independence of
professional judgment or with the client-lawyer relationship"). See generally Patterson, Legal Ethics
and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.J. 909 (1980).
358. See Rev. Rul. 75-76, 1975-1 C.B. 154, 155 (neither expectation nor possibility, however
remote, of award of fees may be substantial motivating factor in selection of cases for nonprofit public
interest law firm).
359. Cf REVISED MODEL NONPROFIT CORPORATION AcT (ABA Section of Corporation, Bank-
ing and Business Law, Committee on Nonprofit Corporations Exposure Draft March 1986) (develop-
ing general standards for nonprofit corporations).
360. Enforcing the rules against third-party interference with the attorney-client relationship
might be less effective than the fee-sharing prohibition because lawyers seldom report misconduct by
other lawyers. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 8.3 comment (Code's requirement in DR 1-
103(A) that lawyer report every violation of disciplinary rules "proved to be unenforceable"). In
addition, clients might not know if a staff lawyer is being improperly influenced. The bar could step
up enforcement against lawyers for public interest groups, but most state bars have few well-trained
investigators, and many states have too few disciplinary counsel to handle all of the complaints that
are deemed worthy of prosecution. See, e.g., Carrizosa, Watchdog Panel's Report Finds Few Disci-
pline Problems, L.A. Daily J., July 21, 1988, at 1, col. 2 ("[T]he bar needs to do more to provide its
investigators with better training, more consistent supervision and clearer policies and procedures.");
Jost, The Public's Stake in Lawyer Discipline, L.A. Daily J., Apr. 8, 1985, at 3, col. 5 (portraying
disciplinary system as "lenient, secretive, and slow"). But see Zazzali, Disciplining Attorneys: The
New Jersey Experience, 1 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 659, 688 (1988) (concluding that New Jersey
disciplinary system has been successful in punishing and deterring misconduct).
361. Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 2667, 2676 (1988).
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prophylactic rules."6 2 The fee-sharing rule does sacrifice speech for effi-
ciency, and thus fails to meet the least restrictive means test.
States can cure the problem of imprecision by writing a new rule that
prohibits fee sharing with any organization that exerts control over the
actual conduct of litigation or otherwise interferes with the attorney-client
relationship. Furthermore, states can continue to seek empirical or histori-
cal evidence that fee sharing with public interest organizations leads to
improper conflicts or control so frequently that it can be said to pose a
"serious danger" to the attorney-client relationship. But under the Su-
preme Court's consistent jurisprudence in the area of group legal services,
a fee-sharing rule that prohibits all fee sharing between all lawyers and
all nonlawyer public interest organizations is unconstitutionally imprecise
and hence unenforceable.
CONCLUSION
The wall of separation between lawyers and nonlawyers has been vir-
tually unbreachable for almost a century. Today, the prohibition against
sharing fees with a nonlawyer is nearly universal. This prohibition was
originally intended to thwart ambulance chasers and to prevent banks and
commercial law corporations from transforming the practice of law into
an ordinary commercial business, with the resulting unrestricted emphasis
on the hard sell and the bottom line. But the organized bar has consist-
ently applied the ban on fee sharing to nonprofit entities.
Nonprofit public interest organizations have made great strides in over-
coming statutes and regulations against solicitation and unauthorized
practice that stood in the way of organized public interest litigation. Pub-
lic interest groups have now firmly established their constitutional rights
to sponsor and solicit litigation and to recommend or provide attorneys. As
362. In Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988), for example, the Court
struck down a Kentucky rule completely prohibiting lawyers from sending "targeted" letters to poten-
tial clients known to need legal services of the type offered by the lawyer in a particular matter. The
Court noted that the state could regulate abuses in targeted letters "through far less restrictive and
more precise means" than a total ban. Id. at 1923. The Court expressly rejected the state's contention
that policing abuses "in targeted letters would be too onerous:
To be sure, a state agency or bar association that reviews solicitation letters might have more
work than one that does not. But '[o]ur recent decisions involving commercial spkech have been
grounded in the faith that the free flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify
imposing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false, the
helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the harmful.'
Id. at 1924 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 646 (1985)); see also
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 644-45 (rejecting state's argument that legal advice in advertisements may be
banned because "it is intrinsically difficult to distinguish advertisements containing legal advice that is
false or deceptive from those that are truthful and helpful, much more so than is the case with other
goods or services" (footnote omitted)); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977) (rejecting state's
argument that "wholesale restriction" on lawyer advertising is "justified by the problems of enforce-
ment if any other course is taken"). But see Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 466
(1978) (allowing state to enforce prohibition against in-person solicitation of legal business for pecuni-
ary gain in absence of showing of actual harm, because "in-person solicitation would be virtually
immune to effective oversight and regulation" if state were required to prove actual harm).
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yet, however, the Supreme Court has not definitively stated that those
constitutional rights encompass the rights of lawyers to share fees with
public interest organizations. The time has come to recognize that lawyers
ought to have that right.
We live in an era of deregulation. In many spheres, the drive for dereg-
ulation has come from the executive branch, the independent agencies, or
the legislatures-that is, from traditional sources of rulemaking. In the
legal profession, however, the impetus for deregulation has come almost
exclusively from the United States Supreme Court. In a series of ten cases
on advertising and group legal services spanning a twenty-five year pe-
riod, the Supreme Court has decided against state bar associations and
reversed state supreme courts nine times. This reflects poorly on the or-
ganized bar's capacity for leadership. I understand the bar's reverence for
the attorney-client relationship and its determination to maintain profes-
sionalism among lawyers, and I share those values. But I also believe that
the bar should continually reexamine its premises and its rules, especially
when those rules jeopardize constitutional rights and values.
The rule against sharing fees with nonlawyers is ripe for reexamina-
tion. The Kutak Commission believed that the rule ought to be reexam-
ined in all contexts, commercial as well as nonprofit. The ABA's House of
Delegates voted down the Kutak Commission's proposed revision, but my
proposed revision is more modest. I propose simply that lawyers be per-
mitted to share legal fees with nonprofit public interest organizations as
long as the organizations do not interfere with the attorney-client relation-
ship or otherwise commit the evils at which the fee-sharing rule is now
aimed. This express exception to the rule against fee sharing with
nonlawyers would further the policies underlying statutory fee-shifting
provisions, assist political expression by minorities, and advance the bar's
stated goal of making high quality legal services more widely available to
those who might otherwise lack representation.
Perhaps in debating and formulating an express exception for fee shar-
ing with nonprofit groups, the bar will conclude that the entire fee-
sharing rule needs to be revised, even in the commercial sphere. Given the
weaknesses of the state's policy reasons for maintaining the prohibition
against fee sharing, and given the increasing need of clients for a range of
services broader than lawyers alone can provide, a searching reexamina-
tion of the rule would make sense.3 63 In the meantime, I hope that the
courts and bar associations called upon to rule on the question presented
in this Article will state unequivocally that lawyers may share legal fees
with nonprofit organizations as long as there is no proof of actual harm.
363. For a recent scholarly reexamination of the fee-sharing rule in the for-profit context, see
Gilbert & Lempert, supra note 71, at 383 (discussing North Dakota and District of Columbia pro-
posals to allow nonlawyers to form partnerships with lawyers under limited circumstances).
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